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Unions	  and	  citizens:	  membership	  status	  and	  
political	  rights	  in	  Scotland,	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  EU	  	  Jo	  Shaw,	  University	  of	  Edinburgh*	  	  To	  appear	  in:	  C.	  Closa	  (ed.),	  Secession	  from	  a	  Member	  State	  and	  Withdrawal	  from	  the	  European	  
Union:	  Troubled	  Membership,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2016	  forthcoming	  	  
ABSTRACT	  This	  chapter	  –	  in	  a	  volume	  analysing	  aspects	  of	  the	  putative	  withdrawal	  of	  a	  Member	  State	  from	  the	  European	  Union	  and/or	  the	  secession	  of	  a	  ‘region’	  from	  a	  (Member)	  state	  –	  makes	  use	  of	  the	  lenses	  of	  citizenship	  to	  explore	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	  two	  dimensions	  of	  	  ‘troubled	  membership’.	  It	  applies	  a	  law-­‐and-­‐politics	  approach,	  which	  locates	  legal	  change	  in	  its	  broader	  political	  context	  and	  focuses	  on	  the	  contestation	  of	  the	  boundaries	  of	  polity	  membership.	  After	  setting	  the	  scene	  (Section	  2),	  the	  chapter	  explores	  the	  content	  of	  a	  possible	  future	  Scottish	  citizenship	  regime	  (Section	  3)	  and	  then	  examines	  the	  intertwining	  of	  formal	  legal	  membership	  and	  political	  citizenship	  in	  respect	  of	  both	  the	  Scottish	  referendum	  and	  the	  UK’s	  referendum	  on	  EU	  membership	  (Section	  4).	  The	  threads	  are	  drawn	  together	  in	  the	  conclusions	  (Section	  5)	  through	  a	  discussion	  of	  how	  the	  EU	  referendum	  outcomes	  may	  impact	  upon	  the	  issue	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  Scottish	  referendum	  debate,	  namely	  the	  ongoing	  viability	  of	  the	  UK	  as	  a	  union	  state.	  	  
KEYWORDS	  Citizenship,	  Scotland,	  European	  Union,	  political	  rights,	  migration,	  constitutionalism,	  referendums,	  United	  Kingdom	  	  
1.	  Introduction	  The	  primary	  objective	  of	  this	  volume	  is	  to	  analyse	  aspects	  of	  the	  putative	  withdrawal	  of	  a	  Member	  State	  from	  the	  European	  Union	  and/or	  the	  secession	  of	  a	  ‘region’	  from	  a	  (Member)	  state.	  This	  raises	  important	  legal,	  political	  and	  normative	  questions,	  with	  few	  precedents	  to	  help	  us.	  This	  chapter	  uses	  the	  lenses	  of	  citizenship	  to	  explore	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	  two	  dimensions	  of	  ‘troubled	  membership’,	  applying	  a	  law-­‐and-­‐politics	  approach	  which	  locates	  legal	  change	  in	  its	  broader	  political	  context	  and	  focuses	  on	  the	  contestation	  of	  the	  boundaries	  of	  polity	  membership.1	  After	  setting	  the	  scene	  (Section	  2),	  the	  chapter	  explores	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *	  This	  paper	  draws	  on	  J.	  Shaw,	  ‘Citizenship	  in	  an	  independent	  Scotland:	  legal	  status	  and	  political	  implications’	  CITSEE	  Working	  Paper	  2013/34	  and	  J.	  Shaw	  ‘Citizenship	  in	  an	  independent	  Scotland’,	  Evidence	  submitted	  to	  the	  European	  and	  External	  Relations	  Committee	  of	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament,	  15	  May	  2014.	  I	  am	  grateful	  to	  the	  editor	  for	  very	  helpful	  guidance	  on	  reshaping	  a	  first	  draft	  of	  this	  paper.	  I	  alone	  remain	  responsible	  for	  errors.	  1	  Space	  precludes	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  how	  the	  two	  referendums	  discussed	  in	  this	  chapter	  have	  come	  about	  or	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  referendum	  debates	  themselves.	  Suffice	  it	  to	  say	  that	  the	  holding	  of	  referendums	  –	  constitutional	  or	  otherwise	  –	  represents	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  political	  process	  (Stephen	  Tierney	  describes	  it	  as	  an	  ‘inauspicious	  history’	  in	  the	  UK	  context:	  S.	  Tierney,	  ‘Reclaiming	  Politics:	  Popular	  Democracy	  in	  Britain	  after	  the	  Scottish	  Referendum’,	  (2015)	  86	  The	  Political	  
Quarterly	  226–233),	  and	  is	  apt	  to	  show	  that	  one	  side	  or	  indeed	  both	  see	  a	  political	  advantage	  in	  invoking	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  plebiscite.	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content	  of	  a	  possible	  future	  Scottish	  citizenship	  regime	  (Section	  3)	  and	  then	  examines	  the	  intertwining	  of	  formal	  legal	  membership	  and	  political	  citizenship	  in	  respect	  of	  both	  the	  Scottish	  referendum	  and	  the	  UK’s	  2016	  EU	  referendum	  (Section	  4).	  The	  threads	  are	  drawn	  together	  in	  the	  conclusions	  (Section	  5)	  through	  a	  discussion	  of	  how	  the	  EU	  referendum	  outcome	  is	  already	  impacting	  upon	  the	  issue	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  Scottish	  referendum	  debate,	  namely	  the	  ongoing	  viability	  of	  the	  UK	  as	  a	  union	  state.	  	  
2.	  Setting	  the	  scene:	  citizenship	  and	  constitutional	  change	  in	  Scotland,	  the	  
United	  Kingdom	  and	  the	  European	  Union	  As	  an	  example	  of	  troubled	  membership,	  the	  situation	  in	  the	  UK	  is	  unique.	  Two	  unions	  are	  simultaneously	  contested.	  The	  300-­‐plus-­‐year	  Union	  between	  England	  and	  Scotland	  which	  formed	  the	  basis	  of	  what	  we	  now	  know	  as	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  of	  Great	  Britain	  and	  Northern	  Ireland	  was	  directly	  challenged	  in	  a	  September	  2014	  referendum	  on	  Scottish	  independence.	  This	  referendum	  was	  framed	  by	  a	  political	  agreement	  between	  the	  Scottish	  and	  UK	  Governments	  (the	  so-­‐called	  Edinburgh	  Agreement)2	  implemented	  by	  legislation	  in	  the	  Westminster	  and	  Scottish	  Parliaments.3	  In	  the	  event,	  Scotland	  voted	  by	  a	  margin	  of	  55	  percent	  to	  45	  percent	  to	  remain	  in	  the	  UK.	  	  The	  forty-­‐year	  ‘union’	  brought	  about	  by	  UK	  accession	  to	  the	  European	  Communities	  on	  1	  January	  1973	  has	  also	  been	  also	  contested.	  On	  23	  June	  2016,	  the	  UK	  voted	  in	  a	  referendum	  on	  EU	  membership.	  After	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Lisbon,	  such	  a	  national	  referendum	  has	  been	  validated	  as	  a	  legitimate	  political	  trigger	  for	  constitutional	  change,	  with	  Article	  50	  TEU	  now	  regulating	  the	  terms	  of	  consensual	  withdrawal	  from	  the	  Union.4	  By	  a	  margin	  of	  52	  percent	  to	  48	  percent	  on	  a	  turnout	  of	  more	  than	  72	  percent	  (i.e.	  comparing	  well	  with	  a	  66	  percent	  turnout	  in	  the	  2015	  General	  Election),	  the	  voters	  of	  the	  UK	  answered	  ‘Leave’	  to	  the	  question	  ‘Should	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  remain	  a	  member	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  or	  leave	  the	  European	  Union?’.	  	  In	  both	  cases,	  a	  ‘yes’	  or	  ‘leave’	  vote	  was	  always	  going	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  new	  constitutional	  situation	  with	  uncertain	  consequences.	  It	  would	  provide	  an	  important	  (and	  legally	  challenging)	  case	  study	  of	  how	  polities	  emerge,	  evolve,	  decay	  and	  sometimes	  disappear	  over	  time.	  This	  would	  have	  significant	  effects	  on	  citizenship	  regimes,	  as	  polity	  change	  brings	  about	  constitutional	  change	  and	  new	  sites	  of	  contestation	  over	  belonging	  and	  membership.	  The	  outcome	  is	  all	  the	  more	  complex	  because	  in	  recent	  years,	  we	  have	  seen	  the	  decline	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  Agreement	  between	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  Government	  and	  the	  Scottish	  Government	  on	  a	  referendum	  
on	  independence	  for	  Scotland,	  Edinburgh,	  15	  October	  2012,	  www.gov.scot/About/Government/concordats/Referendum-­‐on-­‐independence,	  accessed	  19	  July	  2016.	  3	  The	  UK/Westminster	  Parliament	  and	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament	  both	  adopted	  an	  Order	  in	  Council	  under	  Section	  30	  of	  the	  Scotland	  Act	  1998,	  to	  allow	  a	  single	  question	  referendum	  to	  take	  place	  on	  the	  question	  of	  Scottish	  independence,	  with	  details,	  including	  the	  date,	  the	  franchise	  and	  the	  question	  to	  be	  determined	  by	  legislation	  adopted	  by	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament.	  This	  alters	  the	  schedule	  of	  powers	  reserved	  to	  the	  UK	  Parliament	  under	  the	  current	  devolution	  settlement.	  The	  Scottish	  Independence	  Referendum	  Act	  2013	  and	  the	  Scottish	  Independence	  Referendum	  (Franchise)	  Act	  2013	  set	  out	  the	  details	  of	  the	  referendum.	  4	  See	  C.	  Closa	  in	  this	  volume	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Westphalian	  states	  system	  as	  the	  exclusive	  underpinning	  element	  of	  citizenship,	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  semi-­‐sovereign	  polities	  at	  the	  regional,	  national,	  supranational	  and	  international	  level,	  often	  conferring	  a	  range	  of	  citizenship-­‐like	  rights	  upon	  individuals	  on	  a	  territorial	  or	  a	  jurisdictional	  basis.	  In	  the	  context	  provided	  by	  the	  EU	  treaties	  and	  other	  international	  and	  transnational	  legal	  instruments,	  polities	  emerge	  and	  evolve	  not	  just	  under	  the	  shadow	  of	  the	  law,	  but	  through	  the	  law	  itself,	  under	  the	  shadow	  of	  politics,	  political	  practice	  and	  constitutional	  principles,	  such	  as	  the	  principles	  of	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights.	  In	  like	  manner,	  as	  political	  space	  is	  restructured,	  the	  different	  legal	  frameworks	  governing	  membership	  statuses	  and	  rights	  emerge,	  evolve,	  decay	  and	  sometimes	  disappear,	  sometimes	  under	  conditions	  of	  considerable	  legal	  uncertainty	  as	  regards	  the	  implications	  of	  and	  for	  domestic	  law,	  EU	  law	  and	  international	  law.	  	  But	  the	  need	  to	  connect	  the	  individual	  and	  the	  polity	  or	  polities	  occupying	  the	  territorial	  or	  legal	  space	  or	  spaces	  within	  which	  the	  individual	  resides,	  works	  or	  travels,	  or	  to	  which	  he	  or	  she	  otherwise	  enjoys	  a	  connection,	  is	  an	  enduring	  one.	  It	  is	  one	  that	  sets	  many	  of	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  life	  opportunities,	  both	  in	  principle	  and	  in	  practice.	  Being	  born	  with,	  or	  subsequently	  acquiring	  the	  citizenship	  status	  of	  certain	  states5	  currently	  conveys	  significant	  life	  opportunities	  not	  available	  to	  others.6	  This	  was	  one	  reason	  why	  many	  saw	  the	  prospect	  of	  continued	  or	  renewed	  EU	  membership	  for	  Scotland	  after	  independence	  as	  a	  central	  element	  of	  the	  argument	  that	  a	  small	  Scotland	  could	  be	  a	  viable	  and	  prosperous	  state.	  EU	  citizenship,	  although	  not	  a	  new	  ‘nationality’	  as	  such	  but	  rather	  a	  bundle	  of	  rights	  associated	  with	  a	  legal	  status	  which	  derives	  its	  scope	  not	  just	  from	  the	  EU	  treaties	  but	  also	  from	  national	  citizenship	  laws,	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  vital	  element	  of	  the	  EU	  membership	  package,	  both	  for	  putative	  Scottish	  citizens	  and	  for	  those	  coming	  to	  or	  resident	  in	  Scotland	  who	  would	  enjoy	  free	  movement	  rights	  if	  Scotland	  remained	  a	  Member	  State.	  Equally,	  EU	  citizenship	  has	  been	  a	  factor	  in	  the	  UK	  EU	  referendum	  debate,	  especially	  as	  free	  movement	  rights	  have	  become	  a	  highly	  contested	  element	  of	  UK	  politics.7	  In	  sum,	  while	  the	  death	  of	  national	  citizenship	  is	  frequently	  announced,	  it	  retains	  an	  enduring	  importance	  which	  becomes	  particularly	  acute	  at	  the	  moments	  which	  polities	  emerge,	  evolve,	  decay	  or	  disappear,	  and	  in	  the	  EU	  context	  it	  is	  supplemented	  in	  important	  ways	  by	  EU	  citizenship.	  This	  premise	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  this	  chapter.	  	  The	  possible	  creation	  of	  an	  independent	  Scotland	  (iScotland),	  with	  an	  uncertain	  status	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  EU	  as	  well	  as	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  UK	  (rUK),	  has	  significant	  citizenship	  implications.	  The	  primary	  question	  concerns	  the	  identification	  of	  who	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  The	  point	  is	  well	  illustrated	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  share	  of	  non-­‐EU	  born	  EU	  citizens	  as	  part	  of	  the	  overall	  population	  of	  EU	  citizens	  resident	  in	  the	  UK	  between	  2004	  and	  2015:	  see	  Commentary,	  Recent	  Trends	  in	  EU	  nationals	  born	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  EU	  (16	  July	  2015)	  www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/migobs/commentary-­‐recent%20trends%20eu%20nationals_0.pdf,	  accessed	  19	  July	  2016.	  To	  put	  it	  another	  way,	  the	  prior	  acquisition	  of	  the	  citizenship	  of	  an	  EU	  Member	  State	  seems	  to	  have	  become	  a	  significant	  factor	  in	  migration	  to	  the	  UK.	  6	  A.	  Shachar,	  The	  Birthright	  Lottery.	  Citizenship	  and	  Global	  Inequality	  (Cambridge	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2009);	  B.	  Milanovic,	  ‘Global	  Inequality	  in	  Numbers:	  In	  History	  and	  Now’	  (2013)	  4	  
Global	  Policy	  198–208	  refers	  to	  a	  ‘citizenship	  premium’	  enjoyed	  by	  citizens	  of	  rich	  states.	  7	  J.	  Shaw,	  ‘Between	  law	  and	  political	  truth?	  Member	  State	  preferences,	  EU	  free	  movement	  rules	  and	  national	  immigration	  law’	  (2015)	  17	  Cambridge	  Yearbook	  of	  European	  Legal	  Studies	  247–286.	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the	  Scottish	  citizens	  who	  might	  benefit	  from	  EU	  citizenship	  are.	  To	  avoid	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  event	  of	  secession,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  expect	  that	  prior	  to	  any	  independence	  referendum,	  especially	  one	  conducted	  under	  democratic	  conditions	  and	  framed	  by	  law,	  it	  should	  already	  be	  more	  or	  less	  clear	  who	  the	  ab	  initio	  citizens	  of	  the	  new	  state	  would	  actually	  be.	  And	  one	  of	  the	  first	  acts	  of	  any	  new	  state	  must	  always	  be	  to	  define	  by	  law	  the	  new	  citizenry	  not	  only	  for	  the	  moment	  of	  independence	  but	  also	  for	  the	  future,	  by	  determining	  the	  rules	  on	  the	  future	  acquisition	  and/or	  transmission	  of	  citizenship	  at	  birth	  and	  thereafter.	  The	  next	  section	  explores	  these	  issues.	  	  But	  the	  territorial	  boundaries	  of	  membership	  regimes	  rarely	  coincide	  precisely	  with	  formal	  legal	  membership,	  and	  many	  benefits	  are	  conferred	  by	  states	  upon	  lawfully	  resident	  non-­‐citizens,	  sometimes	  as	  a	  result	  of	  international	  obligations	  which	  states	  choose	  to	  take	  on	  as	  well	  as	  those	  which	  are	  associated	  with	  membership	  of	  certain	  organisations,	  such	  as	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  or	  the	  European	  Union.	  In	  particular,	  EU	  Member	  States	  are	  obliged	  by	  EU	  law	  to	  ensure	  equal	  treatment	  for	  non-­‐national	  EU	  citizens	  in	  certain	  areas,	  pursuant	  to	  the	  EU	  treaties.	  Indeed	  sometimes	  they	  choose	  to	  do	  so	  without	  any	  supervening	  obligations.	  That	  the	  UK	  has	  permitted	  EU	  citizens	  to	  vote	  in	  Scottish	  Parliament	  and	  other	  devolved	  elections,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  referendum	  on	  Scottish	  independence,	  is	  an	  example	  of	  this	  type	  of	  asymmetry	  between	  legal	  membership	  and	  political	  rights.	  The	  provision	  made	  under	  UK	  law	  goes	  well	  beyond	  the	  EU	  rules	  on	  local	  electoral	  rights	  for	  resident	  EU	  citizens	  under	  Articles	  20	  and	  22	  TFEU.	  That	  said,	  EU	  citizens	  were	  not	  able	  to	  vote	  in	  the	  referendum	  on	  EU	  membership,	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  Section	  4.	  	  In	  addition,	  external	  non-­‐resident	  citizens	  also	  often	  benefit	  under	  national	  law	  from	  a	  range	  of	  rights	  extending	  beyond	  the	  right	  to	  return,	  often	  including	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  in	  some	  or	  all	  elections.8	  Again,	  EU	  law	  has	  some	  effects	  in	  this	  domain.	  EU	  citizens	  returning	  to	  their	  home	  state	  after	  exercising	  their	  free	  movement	  rights	  are	  protected,	  in	  respect	  of	  certain	  non-­‐discrimination	  and	  family	  reunification	  rights,	  by	  EU	  law.9	  But	  EU	  law	  does	  not	  guarantee	  free	  movers	  external	  electoral	  rights	  outside	  the	  territory	  of	  the	  home	  state,	  although	  some	  commentators	  and	  NGOs	  have	  argued	  that	  it	  should	  do.	  As	  we	  shall	  see,	  no	  external	  citizens	  voted	  in	  the	  Scottish	  referendum,	  but	  those	  absent	  from	  the	  UK	  for	  15	  years	  or	  fewer	  were	  able	  to	  vote	  in	  the	  EU	  referendum.	  	  There	  are,	  therefore,	  significant	  tensions	  between	  being	  a	  (national	  and	  EU)	  citizen	  and	  exercising	  political	  citizenship,	  especially	  where	  there	  are	  potentially	  shifting	  polity	  boundaries	  in	  a	  multi-­‐level	  constitutional	  framework	  such	  as	  Scotland/UK/EU.	  In	  order	  to	  explore	  these	  tensions,	  this	  chapter	  uses	  the	  analytical	  framework	  of	  the	  citizenship	  regime.	  This	  combines	  the	  status	  of	  legal	  membership	  with	  the	  body	  of	  ‘citizenship	  rights’.	  Studying	  citizenship	  regimes	  can	  reveal	  the	  ‘lived	  details’10	  of	  a	  polity	  and	  illuminates	  both	  the	  constitutional	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  R.	  Bauböck,	  ‘Morphing	  the	  Demos	  into	  the	  right	  shape.	  Normative	  principles	  for	  enfranchising	  resident	  aliens	  and	  expatriate	  citizens’	  (2015)	  22	  Democratization	  820–839.	  	  9	  Case	  C-­‐370/90	  Surinder	  Singh	  ECLI:EU:C:1992:296.	  10	  K.	  L.	  Scheppele,	  ‘Constitutional	  ethnography:	  an	  introduction’	  (2004)	  38	  Law	  and	  Society	  Review	  389–406.	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the	  practice	  dimensions	  of	  the	  ‘we’.	  There	  has	  been,	  as	  Sandra	  Seubert	  has	  noted,	  a	  discernible	  ‘turn	  to	  practice’	  in	  the	  context	  of	  citizenship	  studies	  over	  the	  years,	  bringing	  in	  both	  the	  formal	  and	  informal	  dimensions	  of	  citizenship	  laws	  and	  practices.11	  The	  contestation	  of	  the	  boundaries	  of	  citizenship	  regimes	  (membership	  status	  and	  rights)	  helps	  us	  to	  understand	  the	  broader	  nature	  of	  the	  polity	  and	  the	  shifting	  constitutional	  landscape.	  Moreover,	  the	  effects	  of	  referendums	  are	  not	  simple	  top	  down	  read-­‐offs	  from	  ballot	  box	  results.	  They	  can,	  and	  do,	  also	  have	  complex	  indirect	  effects	  upon	  the	  citizenship	  regimes	  of	  the	  polities	  affected,	  before,	  during	  and	  after	  referendum	  campaigns.	  	  Such	  a	  citizenship-­‐focused	  analysis	  can	  provide	  useful	  insights	  wherever	  there	  are	  active	  and	  politically	  well-­‐supported	  secessionist	  and/or	  withdrawal	  movements,	  raising	  claims	  in	  the	  context	  of	  mainstream	  politics,	  and	  not	  just	  in	  the	  Scotland/UK	  context.	  However,	  this	  paper	  will	  concentrate	  solely	  upon	  the	  case	  of	  UK/Scotland,	  where	  the	  September	  2014	  referendum	  on	  independence	  resulted	  in	  a	  vote	  of	  55	  percent	  in	  favour	  of	  remaining	  in	  the	  UK.	  This	  demonstrated	  that	  there	  is	  a	  substantial	  groundswell	  of	  opinion	  in	  favour	  of	  independence	  in	  Scotland,	  although	  not	  a	  majority	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  referendum.12	  	  The	  outcome	  of	  the	  EU	  referendum	  for	  the	  UK	  was	  closer	  than	  that	  in	  Scotland	  in	  2014	  (52/48	  as	  against	  55/45)	  and	  demonstrated	  significant	  territorial	  disparities	  in	  terms	  of	  support	  for	  leave/remain	  across	  the	  UK.13	  62	  percent	  of	  people	  in	  Scotland	  voted	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  UK	  remaining	  in	  the	  EU.	  Meanwhile	  England	  voted	  53.5/46.5	  for	  leave	  (although	  most	  of	  London	  voted	  heavily	  to	  remain),	  Wales	  voted	  52.5/47.5	  to	  leave,	  and	  Northern	  Ireland	  voted	  56/44	  to	  remain,	  with	  a	  distinct	  divergence	  across	  the	  two	  communities	  in	  the	  province.	  There	  are	  important	  respects	  in	  which	  the	  continuing	  debate	  about	  Scottish	  independence,	  which	  the	  2014	  referendum	  did	  not	  entirely	  foreclose,	  are	  likely	  to	  influence	  the	  impact	  and	  eventual	  consequences	  of	  the	  EU	  referendum	  and	  may	  have	  influenced	  the	  clear	  difference	  in	  orientation	  discernible	  between	  the	  Scotland,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  England	  and	  Wales	  on	  the	  other.	  	  In	  any	  altered	  constitutional	  situation,	  whether	  that	  results	  from	  a	  secession	  or	  a	  withdrawal	  referendum,	  there	  will	  be	  changes	  to	  the	  conditions	  of	  political	  membership	  in	  all	  of	  the	  polities	  affected,	  demanding	  political	  intervention	  to	  facilitate	  the	  ‘right-­‐sizing’	  of	  the	  demos	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  membership	  status	  and	  political	  rights.	  Even	  just	  the	  threat	  or	  suggestion	  of	  change	  can	  have	  implications	  for	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘who	  we	  are’.	  Do	  we	  define	  ourselves,	  for	  example,	  by	  reference	  to	  a	  territory	  and	  residence	  or	  a	  distinct	  ethnicity?	  Who	  should	  have	  a	  say?	  Defining	  citizenship	  in	  new	  (and	  renewed)	  states	  under	  democratic	  conditions	  of	  secession	  or	  withdrawal	  means	  grappling	  with	  the	  central	  question	  of	  democratic	  participation	  and	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  as	  a	  paradigmatic	  expression	  of	  how	  the	  ‘we’	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  S.	  Seubert,	  ‘Dynamics	  of	  Modern	  Citizenship	  Democracy	  and	  Peopleness	  in	  a	  Global	  Era’,	  (2014)	  21	  Constellations	  547–559.	  12	  For	  an	  overview	  see	  T.	  Mullen,	  ‘The	  Scottish	  Independence	  Referendum	  2014’	  (2014)	  41	  Journal	  
of	  Law	  and	  Society	  627–40.	  13	  	  For	  details	  of	  the	  EU	  referendum	  results,	  see	  http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-­‐information-­‐by-­‐subject/elections-­‐and-­‐referendums/upcoming-­‐elections-­‐and-­‐referendums/eu-­‐referendum/electorate-­‐and-­‐count-­‐information,	  accessed	  19	  July	  2016.	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any	  new	  polity	  is	  defined.	  It	  raises	  important	  and	  complex	  citizenship	  questions	  for	  which	  there	  is	  little	  obvious	  precedent,	  especially	  were	  the	  UK	  to	  vote	  to	  withdraw	  from	  the	  EU	  and	  this	  were	  to	  have	  a	  knock	  on	  effect	  on	  the	  Scottish	  independence	  movement	  and	  the	  UK’s	  territorial	  integrity.	  	  	  
3.	  Citizenship	  in	  a	  new	  state:	  how	  it	  might	  work	  in	  Scotland	  	  
a. The	  purposes	  of	  citizenship	  laws	  Citizenship	  laws	  have	  a	  number	  of	  complementary	  societal	  purposes.14	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  important	  is	  the	  assurance	  of	  a	  stable	  population,	  especially	  through	  the	  transmission	  of	  ‘membership’	  across	  generations,	  where	  most	  people	  acquire	  citizenship	  involuntarily	  at	  birth.	  But	  citizenship	  laws	  also	  determine	  the	  degree	  of	  territorial	  inclusivity	  by	  setting	  out	  the	  terms	  under	  which	  long	  term	  resident	  immigrants	  can	  become	  citizens.	  In	  addition,	  they	  will	  determine	  whether	  citizenship	  must	  be	  an	  exclusive	  relationship,	  or	  whether	  a	  person	  may	  hold	  dual	  or	  multiple	  citizenships.	  Citizenship	  laws	  also	  regulate	  issues	  such	  as	  special	  ties	  to	  the	  state,	  or	  other	  forms	  of	  genuine	  link	  for	  those	  who	  have	  left	  the	  territory	  or	  are	  attached	  to	  it	  only	  by	  descent	  from	  a	  citizen	  born	  in	  the	  territory,	  by	  providing	  for	  preferential	  naturalisation	  and/or	  citizenship	  by	  descent.	  Citizenship	  laws	  not	  only	  regulate	  who	  can	  acquire	  citizenship,	  but	  also	  who	  loses	  it,	  whether	  through	  absence	  from	  the	  territory,	  through	  voluntary	  acts	  of	  renunciation	  or	  as	  a	  result	  of	  an	  act	  of	  deprivation,	  e.g.	  decisions	  taken	  by	  state	  authorities	  on	  public	  interest	  or	  national	  security	  grounds.	  Finally,	  and	  perhaps	  most	  significantly	  for	  our	  purposes	  in	  this	  chapter,	  citizenship	  laws	  generally	  set	  the	  prima	  facie	  boundaries	  of	  political	  demos,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  providing	  –	  in	  most	  cases	  –	  the	  preliminary	  determination	  of	  who	  can	  vote	  and	  who	  can	  stand	  for	  election,	  especially	  in	  national	  elections.	  	  In	  new	  states,	  all	  of	  these	  issues	  and	  more	  come	  to	  the	  fore,	  as	  the	  new	  state	  will	  have	  to	  define	  its	  own	  citizenry	  ab	  initio.	  Law	  and	  politics	  will	  influence	  the	  outcome.	  In	  iScotland,	  a	  distinctive	  politics	  of	  identity	  would	  certainly	  be	  important,	  as	  would	  Scottish	  demography.	  The	  design	  of	  citizenship	  laws	  would	  offer	  one	  of	  the	  routes	  by	  which	  iScotland	  could	  simultaneously	  both	  distinguish	  itself	  from	  rUK	  (e.g.	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  conditions	  it	  might	  place	  on	  naturalisation,	  in	  its	  approach	  to	  the	  transmission	  of	  citizenship	  outside	  the	  territory,	  or	  in	  its	  approach	  to	  rights	  attaching	  to	  citizenship),	  whilst	  at	  the	  same	  time	  reassuring	  new	  Scots	  about	  the	  validity	  and	  durability	  of	  their	  continuing	  social	  and	  economic	  ties	  across	  these	  islands.	  This	  latter	  is	  part	  of	  a	  tactic	  of	  postulating	  secession	  as	  a	  relatively	  ‘soft’	  process	  in	  which	  some	  key	  aspects	  of	  life	  would	  not	  change,	  or	  would	  change	  little,	  and	  in	  which	  changes	  would	  come	  about	  consensually	  and	  through	  democratic	  processes.	  	  
b. The	  Scottish	  context	  –	  an	  emerging	  distinctive	  identity	  against	  a	  
history	  of	  emigration	  Even	  though	  Scotland	  has	  not	  been	  an	  independent	  state	  for	  more	  than	  300	  years,	  claims	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  Scotland	  as	  a	  ‘nation’	  within	  the	  UK	  have	  always	  been	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  M.	  Vink	  and	  R.	  Bauböck,	  ‘Citizenship	  configurations:	  Analysing	  the	  multiple	  purposes	  of	  citizenship	  regimes	  in	  Europe’	  (2013)	  11(1)	  Comparative	  European	  Politics	  621–648.	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closely	  intertwined	  with	  the	  ebbs	  and	  flows	  of	  a	  distinctive	  Scottish	  identity	  within	  the	  ebbs	  and	  flows	  of	  the	  British	  state.15	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  most	  clearly	  after	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  when	  stronger	  movements	  for	  greater	  self-­‐government	  and	  independence	  emerged	  in	  Scotland.	  	  Between	  the	  1970s	  (when	  it	  had	  its	  first	  major	  electoral	  breakthroughs)	  and	  2007,	  when	  it	  first	  formed	  a	  minority	  government	  under	  the	  devolved	  powers	  of	  the	  Scotland	  Act	  1998,	  the	  Scottish	  National	  Party	  (SNP)	  has	  transformed	  into	  ‘civic	  nationalist’	  party.16	  Territory	  and	  residence,	  not	  descent	  or	  ethnicity,	  have	  become	  the	  central	  elements	  of	  attachment	  to	  Scotland	  in	  elite	  discourse	  and	  to	  a	  degree,	  in	  the	  public	  imagination.	  	  In	  addition,	  as	  Jonathan	  White	  has	  highlighted,	  the	  prevailing	  identity-­‐based	  approach	  to	  politics	  in	  Scotland	  has	  latterly	  partly	  shifted	  towards	  a	  partisan	  approach	  based	  on	  opposing	  austerity	  as	  an	  economic	  policy.17	  By	  adopting	  the	  trope	  of	  opposition	  to	  austerity	  as	  a	  badge	  of	  identity,	  the	  SNP	  has	  gone	  beyond	  regionalism	  and	  the	  politics	  of	  territory,	  and	  posed	  itself	  as	  lying	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  a	  larger	  alternative	  narrative	  for	  British	  politics	  as	  well	  as	  just	  Scottish	  politics.	  	  This	  basis	  for	  a	  national	  sense	  of	  self	  has	  grafted	  itself	  comfortably	  onto	  the	  sense	  of	  Scottishness	  which	  emerged	  after	  1979.	  The	  election	  of	  Margaret	  Thatcher’s	  first	  Conservative	  Government,	  which	  saw	  cold	  winds	  of	  de-­‐industrialisation	  sweeping	  through	  much	  of	  Scotland,	  followed	  hard	  on	  the	  heels	  of	  the	  March	  1979	  devolution	  referendum,	  in	  which	  the	  SNP	  called	  for	  a	  no	  vote.	  The	  proposal	  to	  institute	  devolved	  institutions	  failed,	  even	  though	  it	  was	  supported	  by	  a	  majority	  at	  the	  ballot	  box,	  because	  a	  required	  threshold	  of	  40	  percent	  of	  the	  registered	  electorate	  supporting	  the	  initiative	  was	  not	  met.	  Throughout	  the	  eighteen	  years	  of	  Conservative	  Party	  government,	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  grievance	  at	  the	  imposition	  of	  policies	  by	  outsiders	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  control	  of	  the	  instruments	  of	  government	  developed.	  Conservative	  Party	  support	  (and	  parliamentary	  representation)	  collapsed	  completely	  in	  Scotland,	  from	  a	  high	  point	  of	  more	  than	  50	  percent	  in	  1955	  to	  a	  low	  point	  of	  less	  than	  15	  percent	  in	  2015.	  Initially,	  the	  decline	  of	  the	  Conservative	  vote	  resulted	  in	  Labour	  Party	  dominance.	  Labour	  had	  led	  the	  very	  popular	  pro-­‐devolution	  movement	  before	  and	  after	  1997.	  More	  recently,	  as	  Labour	  became	  increasingly	  compromised	  by	  its	  thirteen	  years	  in	  (Westminster)	  power,	  including	  the	  years	  of	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis,	  and	  its	  adherence	  to	  a	  neo-­‐liberal	  anti-­‐austerity	  rhetoric,	  the	  SNP	  has	  emerged	  as	  the	  utterly	  dominant	  actor	  in	  Scottish	  politics	  in	  the	  mid	  2010s.	  It	  secured	  a	  landslide	  56	  of	  the	  59	  Scottish	  seats	  in	  the	  2015	  UK	  General	  Election,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  more	  substantial	  Yes	  vote	  in	  the	  2014	  referendum	  than	  was	  predicted	  by	  the	  polls	  and	  the	  expert	  observers	  when	  the	  campaign	  started.	  2016	  saw	  it	  re-­‐elected,	  albeit	  no	  longer	  with	  an	  outright	  majority,	  as	  the	  dominant	  force	  in	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament	  and	  able	  to	  form	  a	  minority	  government	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  M.	  Pittock,	  ‘Scottish	  sovereignty	  and	  the	  union	  of	  1707:	  Then	  and	  now’	  (2012)	  14	  National	  
Identities	  11–21.	  16	  M.	  Leith,	  ‘Scottish	  National	  Party	  Representations	  of	  Scottishness	  and	  Scotland’	  (2008)	  28	  Politics	  83–92;	  Andrew	  Mycock	  ,	  ‘SNP,	  identity	  and	  citizenship:	  Re-­‐imagining	  state	  and	  nation’	  (2012)	  14	  
National	  Identities	  53–69.	  17	  J.	  White,	  ‘When	  Parties	  Make	  Peoples’	  (2015)	  6	  (1)	  Global	  Policy	  106–114.	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  This	  sense	  of	  Scottish	  identity	  is	  also	  sustained	  by	  a	  perception	  that	  Scots	  are	  somehow	  more	  egalitarian	  and	  more	  interested	  in	  strong	  welfare	  state	  institutions	  than	  are	  the	  English,	  and	  that	  they	  are	  less	  animated	  by	  the	  hostility	  to	  immigration	  (and	  indeed	  free	  movement),	  which	  is	  an	  important	  factor	  in	  negative	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  EU	  in	  England.18	  Although	  this	  perception	  of	  greater	  attachment	  to	  egalitarianism	  barely	  finds	  support	  in	  public	  opinion	  or	  social	  attitudes-­‐based	  research,	  it	  is	  strongly	  articulated	  electorally	  in	  terms	  of	  different	  voting	  patterns	  in	  Scotland	  to	  England,	  largely	  because	  of	  how	  Scots	  have	  built	  certain	  myths	  into	  their	  identity	  and	  their	  belief	  systems.19	  It	  has	  influenced	  perceptions	  of	  what	  a	  future	  Scotland	  ought	  to	  look	  like,	  and	  how	  it	  should	  regulate	  both	  citizenship	  and	  citizenship	  rights.	  Alongside	  these	  changes,	  the	  SNP	  has	  transformed	  itself	  from	  an	  anti-­‐European20	  to	  a	  pro-­‐European	  party,	  brandishing	  the	  slogan	  of	  ‘Scotland	  in	  Europe’,	  to	  sustain	  the	  idea	  that	  small	  states	  are	  those	  that	  do	  best	  from	  EU	  integration.21	  	  Scotland’s	  distinctive	  landscape	  of	  electoral	  support	  for	  parties	  and	  political	  elite	  preferences	  has	  also	  long	  played	  out	  in	  stronger	  popular	  support	  for	  the	  UK	  to	  remain	  in	  the	  EU,	  with	  64	  percent	  of	  voters	  indicating	  in	  the	  British	  Election	  survey	  that	  they	  would	  vote	  to	  remain	  in	  the	  EU,	  and	  24	  percent	  indicating	  they	  would	  vote	  to	  leave.22	  This	  support	  was	  present	  across	  voters	  for	  all	  of	  the	  main	  parties	  in	  Scotland,	  including	  the	  Conservatives.	  In	  the	  event,	  Scotland	  split	  62/38	  with	  no	  single	  Council	  area	  voting	  ‘Leave’.	  From	  early	  on	  in	  the	  campaign	  a	  crucial	  and	  potentially	  painful	  difference	  between	  Scotland	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  UK	  was	  visible.23	  In	  the	  event	  there	  was	  a	  14	  point	  difference	  between	  the	  outcomes	  in	  Scotland	  and	  the	  UK	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  Finally,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  the	  demography	  of	  modern	  Scotland.	  For	  many	  centuries,	  Scotland	  has	  been	  a	  country	  of	  emigration.	  However,	  the	  picture	  has	  become	  more	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  J.	  Portes,	  ‘Free	  movement:	  here	  to	  stay?’	  (10	  January	  2016)	  NIESR	  Blog,	  www.niesr.ac.uk/blog/free-­‐movementhere-­‐stay#.VpOgP_HezTE,	  accessed	  19	  July	  2016.	  	  19	  A.	  Henderson,	  ‘The	  myth	  of	  meritocratic	  Scotland:	  political	  cultures	  in	  the	  UK’,	  in	  P.	  Cowley	  and	  R.	  Ford	  (eds.)	  Sex,	  Lies	  and	  the	  Ballot	  Box	  (London:	  Biteback	  Publishing,	  2014);	  and	  A.	  Henderson,	  C.	  Jeffrey	  and	  R.	  Lineira,	  ‘National	  Identity	  or	  National	  Interest?	  Scottish,	  English	  and	  Welsh	  Attitudes	  to	  the	  Constitutional	  Debate’	  (2015)	  86	  The	  Political	  Quarterly	  265–274.	  20	  In	  the	  1975	  referendum	  the	  SNP	  campaigned	  for	  the	  UK	  to	  leave	  ‘the	  common	  market’,	  because	  initially	  it	  believed	  that	  this	  was	  the	  direction	  in	  which	  public	  opinion	  was	  heading.	  See	  J.	  Mitchell,	  ‘The	  EU	  Referendum:	  Unpredictable	  in	  Scotland	  and	  the	  UK’	  (1	  December	  2015)	  European	  Futures	  Blog,	  	  http://www.europeanfutures.ed.ac.uk/article-­‐2246,	  accessed	  19	  July	  2016.	  In	  the	  event,	  every	  part	  of	  Scotland	  voted	  to	  remain	  in	  the	  EEC,	  apart	  from	  Orkney	  and	  Shetland.	  21	  J.	  Shaw,	  ‘Scotland:	  40	  Years	  of	  EU	  Membership’	  (2012)	  8	  Journal	  of	  Contemporary	  European	  
Research	  547–554.	  22	  J.	  Curtice,	  Britain	  Divided?	  Who	  supports	  and	  opposes	  EU	  Membership,	  What	  UK	  Thinks	  (October	  2015)	  Analysis	  Paper	  1,	  http://whatukthinks.org/eu/wp-­‐content/uploads/2015/10/Analysis-­‐paper-­‐1-­‐Britain-­‐divided.pdf,	  accessed	  19	  Juy	  2016.	  	  23	  ‘Scots	  want	  to	  stay	  in	  EU,	  as	  the	  rest	  of	  Britain	  wants	  to	  say	  goodbye,	  says	  new	  poll’	  (2	  November	  2015)	  The	  Herald,	  www.heraldscotland.com/news/13187523.Scots_want_to_stay_in_EU__as_the_rest_of_Britain_wants_to_say_goodbye__says_new_poll/,	  accessed	  19	  July	  2016.	  Nigel	  Farage	  famously	  described	  the	  ‘Brexit’	  campaign	  in	  Scotland	  in	  February	  2016	  as	  ‘a	  bit	  embryonic’,	  see	  G.	  Campbell,	  ‘Brexit	  campaign	  “embryonic”	  in	  Scotland’	  (1	  February	  2016)	  BBC	  News,	  www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-­‐scotland-­‐scotland-­‐politics-­‐35458658,	  accessed	  19	  July	  2016	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complex	  in	  recent	  years.	  The	  historical	  patterns	  of	  emigration	  continue	  –	  with	  perhaps	  a	  million	  persons	  born	  in	  Scotland	  not	  resident	  there	  at	  present	  (against	  a	  current	  population	  of	  around	  5.4m).24	  But	  Scotland	  has	  also	  become	  a	  migration	  destination	  and	  there	  are	  increasing	  numbers	  of	  non-­‐UK	  citizens	  and	  non-­‐UK	  born	  UK	  citizens	  resident	  in	  Scotland	  (as	  well	  as	  continuing	  high	  levels	  of	  mobility	  between	  Scotland	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  UK).	  Scotland	  mirrors	  patterns	  of	  immigration	  visible	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  UK,	  although	  with	  lower	  numbers	  of	  migrants.25	  Citizenship	  laws	  would	  thus	  grant	  Scotland	  one	  means	  to	  respond	  to	  its	  distinctive	  demographic	  challenges	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  relatively	  stagnant	  population	  and	  –	  in	  common	  with	  other	  advanced	  post-­‐industrial	  states	  –	  an	  ageing	  population,26	  as	  well	  as	  to	  express	  the	  distinctive	  identity	  politics	  sketched	  above.	  	  	  
c. Theory	  into	  practice	  and	  identity	  politics	  into	  law:	  what	  would	  Scottish	  
citizenship	  look	  like?	  There	  is	  guidance	  from	  both	  state	  practice	  and	  international	  law	  instruments	  to	  assist	  lawmakers	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  norms	  of	  citizenship	  in	  seceding	  states.	  Scotland	  has	  no	  modern	  history	  of	  statehood	  –	  and	  no	  historical	  citizenry	  –	  on	  which	  to	  draw,	  and	  thus	  the	  ‘restored	  state’	  model	  of	  new	  citizenship	  used	  in	  some	  states27	  cannot	  be	  invoked.	  Moreover,	  the	  ‘federal’	  model	  of	  new	  citizenship	  building	  is	  not	  applicable,	  given	  the	  limited	  character	  of	  the	  UK’s	  asymmetric	  devolution	  arrangements.	  Unlike	  the	  former	  federations	  Yugoslavia	  or	  Czechoslovakia,	  there	  is	  no	  former	  ‘republican’	  or	  regional	  level	  citizenship,	  in	  a	  formal	  sense,	  on	  which	  to	  draw.28	  Consequently,	  iScotland	  would	  probably	  use	  the	  third	  model	  of	  ab	  initio	  citizenship	  building	  for	  new	  states,	  namely	  the	  residence-­‐based	  or	  territorial	  model.	  This	  approach	  would	  be	  tempered	  by	  continuing	  close	  relationships	  across	  these	  islands,	  not	  only	  between	  iScotland	  and	  the	  rUK,	  but	  also	  with	  Ireland,	  which	  itself	  became	  independent	  from	  what	  we	  now	  call	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  by	  a	  complex	  (and	  often	  violent)	  process	  between	  1919	  and	  1922.	  Ireland’s	  own	  citizenship	  regime,	  built	  up	  over	  many	  years,	  remains	  partially	  entwined	  with	  that	  of	  the	  UK	  in	  ways	  which	  relate	  to	  the	  earlier	  independence	  process,	  to	  ongoing	  patterns	  of	  migration	  and	  –	  more	  recently	  –	  to	  the	  Northern	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  See	  ‘Scotland	  Analysis:	  Devolution	  and	  the	  implications	  of	  Scottish	  Independence’	  (2013)	  Cm	  8544,	  at	  20;	  and	  J.	  Carr	  and	  L.	  Cavanagh,	  ‘Scotland’s	  Diaspora	  and	  Overseas-­‐Born	  Population’	  (2009)	  Scottish	  Government	  Social	  Research.	  25	  For	  an	  overview	  see	  Migration	  Observatory	  Commentary,	  ‘Bordering	  on	  confusion:	  International	  Migration	  and	  Implications	  for	  Scottish	  Independence’	  (16	  September	  2013),	  http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/commentary/bordering-­‐confusion-­‐international-­‐migration-­‐and-­‐implications-­‐scottish-­‐independence,	  accessed	  19	  July	  2016.	  26	  Scottish	  Parliament	  Finance	  Committee	  Report,	  ‘Demographic	  Change	  and	  an	  Ageing	  Population’	  (11	  February	  2013)	  2nd	  Report,	  2013	  (Session	  4),	  www.scottish.parliament.uk/S4_FinanceCommittee/Reports/fiR13-­‐02_rev.pdf,	  accessed	  19	  July	  2016.	  27	  See	  O.	  Shevel,	  ‘The	  Politics	  of	  Citizenship	  Policy	  in	  New	  States’	  (2009)	  41	  Comparative	  Politics	  273–291.	  28	  J.	  Shaw	  and	  I.	  Štiks	  (eds.),	  Citizenship	  after	  Yugoslavia	  (London:	  Taylor	  and	  Francis,	  2012).	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Ireland	  peace	  process.29	  Many	  of	  these	  key	  points	  were	  noted	  in	  UK	  government	  commentary	  on	  proposals	  for	  Scottish	  citizenship.30	  	  In	  international	  law,	  the	  most	  important	  principle	  concerns	  protection	  against	  statelessness	  occurring	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  state.31	  We	  should	  also	  bear	  in	  mind	  that	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Nationality	  (which	  the	  UK	  has	  not	  ratified)	  offers	  benchmarks	  in	  relation	  to	  key	  principles	  such	  as	  non-­‐discrimination.	  As	  for	  EU	  law,	  its	  impact	  is	  far	  more	  attenuated.	  There	  has	  been	  little	  impact	  on	  the	  part	  of	  EU	  law	  on	  the	  cases	  of	  new	  citizenship	  regimes	  in	  Europe	  since	  1989,	  although	  there	  is	  some	  evidence	  of	  pre-­‐accession	  influence.32	  As	  for	  the	  existing	  Member	  States,	  some	  have	  argued	  that	  there	  is	  potential	  for	  EU	  law	  influence	  to	  grow,	  subsequent	  to	  the	  judgment	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  in	  the	  
Rottmann	  case.33	  This	  concluded	  that	  in	  certain	  respects	  national	  rules	  on	  loss	  of	  citizenship	  fell	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  EU	  law	  and	  could	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  importance	  of	  protecting	  the	  essence	  of	  EU	  citizenship.34	  	  Before	  the	  referendum	  campaign	  began,	  there	  were	  few	  hints	  as	  to	  what	  future	  Scottish	  citizenship	  might	  look	  like.	  The	  points	  about	  territory	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  an	  inclusive	  and	  egalitarian	  identity	  discussed	  above	  can	  at	  least	  be	  found	  the	  Scottish	  Government	  2009	  White	  Paper	  Your	  Scotland.	  Your	  Voice:35	  	   Citizenship	  in	  an	  independent	  Scotland	  will	  be	  based	  upon	  an	  inclusive	  model.	  Many	  people	  in	  Scotland	  have	  ties	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  including	  familial,	  social	  and	  economic	  connections.	  An	  independent	  Scotland	  could	  recognise	  the	  complex	  shared	  history	  of	  Scotland	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  by	  offering	  shared	  or	  dual	  citizenship.	  	  A	  related	  2009	  document	  on	  Europe	  and	  Foreign	  Affairs	  also	  mentioned	  the	  importance	  of	  people	  identifying	  ‘with	  the	  community	  in	  which	  they	  live	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  B.	  Ryan,	  Written	  Evidence	  to	  the	  Scottish	  Affairs	  Select	  Committee,	  August	  2012,	  www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmscotaf/139/139we02.htm,	  accessed	  19	  July	  2016.	  	  30	  Scotland	  Analysis,	  ‘Borders	  and	  Citizenship’	  (January	  2014)	  Cm	  8726,	  www.gov.uk/government/publications/scotland-­‐analysis-­‐borders-­‐and-­‐citizenship,	  accessed	  19	  July	  2016;	  J.	  Crawford	  and	  A.	  Boyle,	  ‘Opinion:	  Referendum	  on	  the	  Independence	  of	  Scotland	  –	  International	  Law	  Aspects’,	  published	  as	  Annex	  A	  to	  Scotland	  Analysis,	  ‘Devolution	  and	  the	  implications	  of	  Scottish	  independence’	  (February	  2013)	  Cm	  8554,	  www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/79408/Annex_A.pdf,	  accessed	  19	  July	  2016.	  31	  On	  this	  see	  the	  Draft	  Articles	  of	  the	  International	  Law	  Commission	  on	  Nationality	  of	  Natural	  Persons	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Succession	  of	  States,	  1999,	  www.unhcr.org/5465e1ca9.pdf,	  accessed	  19	  July	  2016.	  	  32	  J.	  Shaw,	  ‘The	  constitutional	  mosaic	  across	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  European	  Union:	  citizenship	  regimes	  in	  the	  new	  states	  of	  South	  Eastern	  Europe’,	  in	  N.	  Walker,	  S.	  Tierney	  and	  J.	  Shaw	  (eds.),	  
Europe’s	  Constitutional	  Mosaic	  (Oxford:	  Hart,	  2011),	  pp.	  137–170.	  33	  Case	  C-­‐135/08	  Rottmann	  v.	  Freistaat	  Bayern,	  ECLI:EU:C:2010:104	  34	  See	  the	  extended	  commentary	  in	  J.	  Shaw	  (ed.),	  ‘Has	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  challenged	  Member	  State	  sovereignty	  in	  nationality	  law?’,	  EUI	  Working	  Paper,	  RSCAS	  2011/62.	  35	  Scottish	  Government,	  ‘Your	  Scotland.	  Your	  Voice.	  A	  National	  Conversation’	  (November	  2009),	  www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2009/11/26155932/0,	  accessed	  19	  July	  2016,	  at	  135	  (para.	  8.22).	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[feeling]	  valued	  and	  part	  of	  Scottish	  society.36	  The	  inclusive	  model	  is	  ‘designed	  to	  support	  economic	  growth,	  integration	  and	  promotion	  of	  diversity.’	  	  The	  2013	  White	  Paper	  Scotland’s	  Future,	  setting	  the	  prospectus	  for	  independence,	  continues	  this	  line	  of	  thinking:	  	   At	  the	  point	  of	  independence,	  this	  Government	  proposes	  an	  inclusive	  model	  of	  citizenship	  for	  people	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  define	  themselves	  as	  primarily	  or	  exclusively	  Scottish	  or	  wish	  to	  become	  a	  Scottish	  passport	  holder.	  People	  in	  Scotland	  are	  accustomed	  to	  multiple	  identities,	  be	  they	  national,	  regional,	  ethnic,	  linguistic	  or	  religious,	  and	  a	  commitment	  to	  a	  multi-­‐cultural	  Scotland	  will	  be	  a	  cornerstone	  of	  the	  nation	  on	  independence.37	  	  
Scotland’s	  Future	  outlined	  a	  number	  of	  pathways	  to	  citizenship,	  both	  on	  and	  after	  independence.	  These	  are	  relatively	  standard	  when	  viewed	  in	  international	  comparison.38	  	  
Table	  1	  
Current	  status	   Scottish	  Citizenship?	  
At	  the	  date	  of	  independence	  British	  citizen	  habitually	  resident	  in	  Scotland	  on	  day	  one	  of	  independence	   Yes,	  automatically	  a	  Scottish	  citizen	  British	  citizens	  born	  in	  Scotland	  but	  living	  outside	  of	  Scotland	  on	  day	  one	  of	  independence	   Yes,	  automatically	  a	  Scottish	  citizen	  
After	  the	  date	  of	  independence	  Child	  born	  in	  Scotland	  to	  at	  least	  one	  parent	  who	  has	  Scottish	  citizenship	  or	  indefinite	  leave	  to	  remain	  at	  the	  time	  of	  their	  birth	  
Yes,	  automatically	  a	  Scottish	  citizen	  
Child	  born	  outside	  Scotland	  to	  at	  least	  one	  parent	  who	  has	  Scottish	  citizenship	   Yes,	  automatically	  a	  Scottish	  citizen	  (the	  birth	  must	  be	  registered	  in	  Scotland	  to	  take	  effect)	  British	  national	  living	  outside	  Scotland	  with	  at	  least	  one	  parent	  who	  qualifies	  for	  Scottish	  citizenship	   Can	  register	  as	  a	  Scottish	  citizen	  (will	  need	  to	  provide	  evidence	  to	  substantiate)	  Citizens	  of	  any	  country,	  who	  have	  a	  parent	  or	  grandparent	  who	  qualifies	  for	  Scottish	  citizenship	   Can	  register	  as	  a	  Scottish	  citizen	  (will	  need	  to	  provide	  evidence	  to	  substantiate)	  Migrants	  in	  Scotland	  legally	   May	  apply	  for	  naturalisation	  as	  a	  Scottish	  citizen	  (subject	  to	  meeting	  good	  character,	  residency	  and	  any	  other	  requirements	  set	  out	  under	  Scottish	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Scottish	  Government,	  ‘Europe	  and	  Foreign	  Affairs.	  Taking	  Forward	  our	  National	  Conversation’	  (Edinburgh,	  2009),	  www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/283886/0086022.pdf,	  accessed	  19	  July	  2016,	  at	  24–25	  (para.	  5.13).	  37	  Scottish	  Government,	  ‘Scotland’s	  Future’	  (November	  2013)	  White	  Paper,	  www.gov.scot/Publications/2013/11/9348,	  accessed	  19	  July	  2016,	  at	  271.	  	  38	  ‘Scotland’s	  Future’,	  273;	  also	  available	  at	  www.gov.scot/Publications/2013/11/9348/11.	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immigration	  law	  Citizens	  of	  any	  country	  who	  have	  spent	  at	  least	  ten	  years	  living	  in	  Scotland	  at	  any	  time	  and	  have	  an	  ongoing	  connection	  with	  Scotland	  
May	  apply	  for	  naturalisation	  as	  a	  Scottish	  citizen	  (subject	  to	  meeting	  good	  character	  and	  any	  other	  requirements	  set	  out	  under	  Scottish	  immigration	  law	  Source:	  Scotland’s	  Future,	  November	  2013	  	  Specifically,	  the	  Government	  proposed	  an	  approach	  to	  citizenship	  ab	  initio	  which	  combined	  residence	  with	  descent.	  Citizenship	  would	  be	  automatically	  attributed	  to	  those	  UK	  citizens	  habitually	  resident	  in	  Scotland	  on	  the	  date	  of	  independence	  and	  to	  those	  UK	  citizens	  who	  were	  born	  in	  Scotland	  and	  but	  were	  resident	  outside	  Scotland.	  No	  explicit	  reference	  is	  made	  to	  a	  right	  to	  choose	  on	  the	  part	  of	  those	  putative	  citizens	  who	  may	  have	  other	  citizenships,	  but	  the	  approach	  suggests	  that	  iScotland	  would	  have	  (at	  least	  potentially)	  a	  substantial	  number	  of	  external	  citizens,	  resident	  either	  in	  rUK	  or	  elsewhere.	  After	  independence,	  the	  routes	  to	  citizenship	  would	  either	  be	  automatic	  (at	  birth),	  by	  registration	  (for	  those	  with	  close	  ties)	  or	  on	  application	  for	  naturalisation	  as	  a	  citizen,	  subject	  to	  conditions.	  	  If	  implemented,	  the	  overall	  scheme	  would	  probably	  have	  been	  somewhat	  more	  generous	  than	  UK	  citizenship	  is	  at	  present,	  allowing	  also	  for	  registration	  by	  citizens	  of	  other	  states	  who	  have	  a	  grandparent	  who	  qualifies	  for	  Scottish	  citizenship.	  This	  suggested	  quite	  a	  strong	  focus	  on	  ethnically	  defined	  citizenship	  transmission	  across	  generations,	  notwithstanding	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  territorial	  and	  residence-­‐based	  inclusion	  given	  such	  attention	  in	  the	  political	  documentation.	  	  However,	  one	  proposed	  route	  to	  naturalisation	  was	  rather	  curious	  and	  raised	  some	  questions	  about	  the	  balance	  between	  territory,	  ethnicity	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  affiliation.	  This	  was	  the	  case	  of	  ‘citizenship	  by	  connection’.	  A	  person	  –	  regardless	  of	  nationality	  –	  could	  apply	  for	  naturalisation	  as	  a	  Scottish	  citizen	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  ten	  years	  of	  prior	  residency,	  whenever	  that	  might	  have	  been	  and	  regardless	  of	  whether	  that	  residency	  was	  still	  subsisting.	  This	  possibility	  was	  intended	  to	  operate	  in	  addition	  to	  ordinary	  naturalisation	  for	  non-­‐citizen	  residents.	  This	  is	  more	  liberal	  than	  ordinary	  naturalisation	  because	  it	  does	  not	  require	  residence	  at	  the	  time	  of	  application,	  although	  ten	  years	  of	  (past)	  residence	  is	  longer	  than	  the	  UK	  currently	  requires	  for	  naturalisation.	  This	  is	  an	  unusual	  mode	  of	  acquisition,	  without	  direct	  equivalent	  in	  other	  states,	  perhaps	  closest	  in	  character	  to	  the	  socialisation	  based	  modes	  of	  acquisition	  found	  in	  some	  states,	  although	  these	  generally	  require	  residence	  as	  a	  condition.39	  It	  shades	  towards	  an	  arbitrary	  and	  overbroad	  preference	  for	  a	  group	  based	  on	  a	  dubious	  and	  undefined	  criterion	  of	  ‘connection’.	  It	  is	  a	  category	  of	  citizenship	  acquisition	  which	  could	  easily	  be	  subject	  to	  ‘deflection	  effects’.	  This	  is	  what	  occurs	  when	  a	  person	  exploits	  some	  condition	  (e.g.	  descent	  from	  former	  citizens	  or,	  in	  this	  case,	  earlier	  residence)	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  a	  passport	  they	  intend	  to	  use	  not	  in	  order	  to	  reside	  in	  the	  target	  state	  (or	  at	  least	  not	  for	  more	  than	  a	  minimum	  of	  time)	  but	  in	  order	  to	  reside	  and	  work	  in	  another	  state	  (in	  this	  case,	  by	  virtue	  of	  EU	  free	  movement	  laws	  or	  domestic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  For	  more	  details	  see	  the	  EUDO	  Citizenship	  Observatory’s	  modes	  of	  acquisition	  databases,	  in	  particular	  mode	  A07:	  http://eudo-­‐citizenship.eu/databases/modes-­‐of-­‐acquisition?p=&application=modesAcquisition&search=1&modeby=idmode&idmode=A07,	  accessed	  19	  July	  2016.	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arrangements	  made	  to	  accommodate	  Scottish	  citizens	  in	  rUK).	  The	  possibility	  that	  such	  deflection	  effects	  might	  operate	  to	  the	  rUK’s	  detriment	  was	  highlighted	  in	  UK	  Government	  commentary	  on	  citizenship.40	  	  	  In	  sum,	  iScotland’s	  citizenship	  law	  seemed	  likely	  to	  be	  rather	  inclusive,	  not	  only	  on	  a	  territorial	  basis,	  but	  also	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  other	  connections	  to	  Scotland,	  including	  ethnicity	  and	  descent,	  as	  well	  as	  past	  residence.	  Such	  a	  broad	  citizenship	  law,	  perhaps	  over-­‐inclusive	  across	  some	  dimensions,	  presented	  an	  interesting	  contrast	  with	  the	  discussion	  –	  developed	  in	  the	  next	  section	  –	  of	  the	  residence-­‐based	  franchise	  which	  was	  applied	  to	  the	  independence	  referendum,	  notwithstanding	  the	  loud	  objections	  of	  persons	  born	  in	  Scotland	  and	  now	  resident	  elsewhere,	  especially	  in	  England.	  For	  some,	  this	  franchise	  was	  under-­‐inclusive.	  	  But	  any	  future	  Scottish	  citizenship	  law	  (which	  is	  bound	  to	  be	  contested,	  not	  only	  initially	  but	  for	  a	  longer	  period	  after	  independence	  by	  those	  who	  felt	  it	  was	  too	  restrictive,	  as	  much	  as	  by	  those	  who	  felt	  it	  was	  too	  inclusive)	  would	  not	  sit	  in	  isolation.	  Geographically	  and	  geopolitically,	  a	  new	  citizenship	  regime	  can	  never	  be	  an	  island,	  with	  its	  legal	  boundaries	  creating	  a	  hermetically	  sealed	  space.	  Scotland	  would	  be	  no	  different.	  Scotland’s	  Future	  acknowledged	  this,	  but	  seemed	  to	  predict	  that	  a	  framework	  of	  softer	  citizenship	  boundaries	  might	  emerge.	  This	  tone	  was	  struck	  probably	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  assurance	  to	  Scottish	  voters	  that	  little	  would	  change	  in	  the	  citizenship	  sphere	  despite	  secession.	  	  The	  proposals	  envisaged	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  very	  substantial	  overlap	  between	  Scottish	  citizenship	  and	  rUK	  citizenship,	  involving	  mutual	  tolerance	  of	  dual	  citizenship.	  It	  is	  implicit	  in	  Scotland’s	  Future	  that	  the	  Scottish	  Government	  envisaged	  that	  new	  Scottish	  citizens	  would	  have	  the	  right	  to	  opt	  (i.e.	  presumably	  to	  choose	  to	  be	  ‘British’	  and/or	  ‘Scottish’).	  It	  had	  perhaps	  looked,	  amongst	  other	  sources	  of	  inspiration,	  at	  the	  right	  of	  option	  in	  Northern	  Ireland	  as	  the	  guide	  for	  this.41	  	  	  But	  this	  may	  be	  a	  situation	  that	  the	  rUK	  would	  choose	  to	  prevent,	  although	  we	  cannot	  at	  this	  moment	  predict	  how	  the	  rUK	  might	  react	  to	  such	  features	  of	  a	  Scottish	  citizenship	  regime.	  The	  rUK	  might,	  for	  example,	  consider	  the	  withdrawal	  –	  in	  accordance	  with	  international	  law	  and	  common	  state	  practice42	  –	  of	  UK	  citizenship	  from	  those	  resident	  in	  Scotland	  and	  enjoying	  the	  benefit	  of	  Scottish	  citizenship,	  who	  lacked	  a	  connection	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  UK	  (e.g.	  those	  born	  in	  Scotland	  who	  had	  never	  been	  resident	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  UK).	  Such	  a	  separation	  of	  citizenship	  regimes	  is	  what	  occurred,	  for	  example,	  when	  many	  former	  UK	  colonies	  and	  dominions	  became	  independent,	  and	  some	  have	  argued	  it	  would	  be	  the	  appropriate	  response	  in	  the	  Scottish	  case.43	  Furthermore,	  the	  rUK	  could	  adopt	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  See	  ‘Borders	  and	  Citizenship’	  (n30),	  at	  para.	  4.48.	  41	  Northern	  Ireland	  Peace	  Agreement	  (Good	  Friday	  Agreement),	  April	  1998,	  read	  in	  conjunction	  with	  Irish	  nationality	  law	  (see	  Ryan	  (n29)).	  42	  B.	  Ryan,	  ‘At	  the	  Borders	  of	  Sovereignty:	  Nationality	  and	  Immigration	  Policy	  in	  an	  Independent	  Scotland’	  (2014)	  28	  Journal	  of	  Immigration	  Asylum	  and	  Nationality	  Law,	  146–164.	  	  43	  C.	  Yeo,	  ‘Dual	  Citizenship	  and	  Scottish	  Independence’	  (15	  September	  2013)	  Free	  Movement	  Blog,	  www.freemovement.org.uk/dual-­‐citizenship-­‐and-­‐scottish-­‐independence/,	  accessed	  19	  July	  2016,	  criticising	  inter	  alia	  Nick	  Barber,	  ‘After	  the	  vote:	  the	  citizenship	  question’	  (4	  August	  2014)	  UK	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hostile	  stance	  towards	  dual	  citizenship,	  thus	  making	  it	  hard	  even	  for	  those	  with	  a	  connection	  to	  both	  states	  to	  hold	  the	  two	  citizenships	  simultaneously.	  	  But	  even	  if	  there	  were	  a	  large	  measure	  of	  separation	  between	  the	  two	  citizenship	  regimes,	  akin	  to	  that	  which	  occurred	  when	  the	  colonies	  and	  dominions	  became	  independent,	  there	  may	  not	  be	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  social	  acceptance	  of	  such	  a	  separation,	  if	  it	  ended	  up	  dividing	  families	  in	  ways	  which	  created	  anomalies	  or	  boundaries	  which	  were	  hard	  to	  understand.	  There	  would	  be	  pressure	  on	  those	  boundaries	  from	  those	  who	  found	  themselves	  just	  one	  side	  or	  the	  other,	  and	  long-­‐term	  contestation	  of	  both	  the	  Scottish	  and	  the	  rUK	  citizenship	  regimes.	  Moreover,	  the	  numbers	  of	  (theoretical	  if	  not	  actual)	  dual	  citizens	  might	  still	  be	  quite	  large,	  given	  the	  degree	  of	  cross-­‐border	  mobility	  across	  the	  UK.	  	  Furthermore,	  experience	  with	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  states	  highlights	  that	  whether	  people	  choose	  to	  ‘adopt’	  new	  citizenships	  that	  they	  are	  given	  after	  birth	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  establishment	  of	  new	  states	  often	  tends	  to	  be	  the	  result	  of	  pragmatic	  considerations.	  The	  decision	  to	  opt	  for	  more	  than	  one	  citizenship	  is	  frequently	  influenced	  by	  considerations	  such	  as	  access	  to	  travel	  documents,	  political	  rights,	  socioeconomic	  rights	  such	  as	  the	  right	  to	  live	  and	  work	  in	  more	  than	  one	  state,	  and	  to	  welfare	  rights,	  perhaps	  with	  a	  dash	  of	  ‘identity’	  thrown	  into	  the	  mix.	  For	  those	  who	  voted	  against	  independence,	  would	  taking	  a	  Scottish	  passport	  be	  seen	  as	  approving	  separation	  after	  the	  event?	  	  The	  nestedness	  of	  citizenship	  regimes	  thus	  has	  both	  geopolitical	  and	  individual	  characteristics	  and	  consequences.	  There	  are	  complex	  interdependencies	  within	  citizenship	  regimes	  and	  between	  different	  regimes,	  often	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  piecemeal	  historical	  evolution	  of	  status,	  rights	  and	  identity.	  This	  is	  certainly	  true	  within	  the	  UK’s	  current	  regime,	  where	  any	  attempts	  to	  change	  certain	  aspects	  of	  the	  regime	  (e.g.	  the	  UK’s	  system	  of	  voting	  rights	  for	  Irish	  and	  certain	  Commonwealth	  citizens	  who	  are	  not	  subject	  to	  immigration	  control)	  in	  order	  to	  make	  the	  regime	  cohere	  around	  a	  specific	  model	  of	  attachment	  and	  polity	  membership	  are	  likely	  to	  run	  aground	  on	  other	  aspects	  of	  the	  regime,	  such	  as	  the	  historically	  close	  links	  across	  these	  islands	  and	  the	  UK’s	  imperial	  history.44	  The	  point	  about	  complex	  and	  hard-­‐to-­‐fathom	  membership	  models	  becomes	  ever	  clearer	  when	  we	  explore	  in	  more	  detail	  the	  interactions	  between	  the	  legal	  status	  of	  citizenship	  and	  other	  dimensions	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  citizenship,	  in	  particular	  political	  rights,	  as	  voting	  is	  a	  paradigmatic	  expression	  of	  the	  democratic	  ‘we’.	  This	  is	  the	  task	  of	  the	  next	  and	  final	  substantive	  section	  of	  this	  chapter.	  	  
4.	  Citizenship	  and	  the	  evolving	  polity:	  ‘rightsizing’	  the	  demos	  A	  new	  citizenship	  regime	  is	  the	  product	  of	  a	  political	  act	  of	  self-­‐determination.	  In	  the	  Scottish	  case,	  this	  is	  rightly	  characterised	  by	  Rainer	  Bauböck	  as	  consensual	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Constitutional	  Law	  Association	  Blog,	  http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2014/08/04/nick-­‐barber-­‐after-­‐the-­‐vote-­‐the-­‐citizenship-­‐question/,	  accessed	  19	  July	  2016.	  44	  J.	  Shaw,	  ‘Citizenship	  and	  Electoral	  Rights	  in	  the	  Multi-­‐Level	  ‘Euro-­‐Polity’:	  the	  case	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom’,	  in	  H.	  Lindahl	  (ed.),	  A	  Right	  to	  Inclusion	  and	  Exclusion?	  Normative	  Fault	  Lines	  of	  the	  EU’s	  
Area	  of	  Freedom,	  Security	  and	  Justice	  (Oxford:	  Hart	  Publishing,	  2009),	  pp.	  241–253.	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democratic	  in	  character,	  rather	  than	  remedial.45	  A	  similar	  point	  can	  be	  made	  about	  a	  vote	  on	  state	  membership	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  since	  the	  EU	  treaties	  now	  include	  a	  provision	  explicitly	  providing	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  withdrawal,	  based	  on	  a	  negotiation	  between	  the	  withdrawing	  state	  and	  the	  other	  Member	  States	  (Article	  50	  TEU).	  But	  how	  should	  the	  self-­‐determining	  ‘we’	  be	  defined	  in	  these	  cases?	  Three	  groups	  of	  issues	  can	  be	  separated	  out:	  	  
• Who	  should	  vote	  in	  any	  independence	  referendum?	  Citizens?	  Residents?	  Some	  combination	  of	  the	  two?	  In	  the	  case	  of	  a	  referendum	  on	  EU	  membership	  (characterised	  by	  Eurosceptic	  forces	  precisely	  as	  an	  ‘independence’	  referendum),	  are	  the	  questions	  (and	  the	  balance	  of	  interests)	  just	  the	  same	  as	  they	  are	  for	  a	  secession	  referendum	  within	  a	  state?	  
• In	  the	  event	  of	  a	  ‘yes’	  vote	  creating	  a	  new	  state	  such	  as	  iScotland,	  who	  should	  be	  able	  to	  vote	  in	  the	  first	  general	  election	  in	  that	  newly	  constituted	  state?	  Has	  the	  vote	  to	  leave	  the	  EU,	  thus	  arguably	  re-­‐constituting	  the	  sovereignty	  the	  UK,	  changed	  the	  constellation	  of	  interests	  which	  determine	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  general	  election	  franchise	  in	  the	  UK?	  
• And,	  finally,	  who	  might	  participate	  –	  and	  how	  –	  in	  any	  constitutional	  convention	  to	  prepare	  a	  long	  term	  written	  constitution	  for	  the	  newly	  reconstituted	  state?	  This	  is	  presently	  only	  an	  issue	  for	  iScotland,46	  as	  despite	  the	  uncertainties	  to	  which	  it	  has	  given	  rise,	  there	  is	  no	  immediate	  suggestion	  that	  the	  leave	  vote	  in	  the	  EU	  referendum	  could	  lead	  to	  a	  constitutional	  reformation	  of	  the	  UK.	  However,	  as	  we	  shall	  discuss	  below,	  the	  UK	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  left	  constitutionally	  unchanged	  by	  the	  vote	  to	  leave	  the	  EU.	  	  This	  section	  concentrates	  on	  the	  questions	  within	  the	  first	  bullet	  point	  from	  an	  empirical	  and	  a	  normative	  perspective,	  as	  the	  second	  and	  third	  sets	  of	  questions	  are	  speculative	  at	  present;	  however,	  the	  normative	  considerations	  discussed	  below	  could	  be	  applicable	  in	  those	  cases	  as	  well.	  With	  respect	  to	  elections	  to	  what	  would	  then	  be	  a	  national	  parliament,	  it	  would	  have	  been	  interesting	  to	  see	  whether	  iScotland	  would	  innovate	  and	  allow	  EU	  citizens	  to	  vote	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  precedent	  set	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  devolved	  institutions	  (and	  in	  line	  with	  arguments	  led	  by	  a	  number	  of	  NGOs	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  European	  Citizens’	  Initiative).47	  This	  would	  reflect	  and	  build	  upon	  the	  present	  reciprocal	  arrangements	  between	  Ireland	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  R.	  Bauböck,	  ‘Regional	  Citizenship	  and	  Self-­‐Determination’,	  in	  R.	  Ziegler,	  J.	  Shaw	  and	  R.	  Bauböck	  (eds.),	  Independence	  Referendums:	  Who	  should	  vote	  and	  who	  should	  be	  offered	  citizenship?	  (2014)	  EUI	  Working	  Paper	  RSCAS	  2014/90.	  46	  As	  Aileen	  McHarg	  has	  noted	  (A.	  McHarg,	  ‘The	  Constitutional	  Case	  for	  Independence’	  (December	  2015),	  in	  A.	  McHarg,	  T.	  Mullen,	  A.	  Page	  and	  N.	  Walker	  (eds.)	  The	  Scottish	  Independence	  Referendum:	  
Constitutional	  and	  Political	  Implications	  (Oxford:	  OUP,	  2016),	  Forthcoming.	  available	  at	  SSRN:	  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2707102)	  constitutional	  questions	  may	  not	  have	  been	  to	  the	  fore	  in	  the	  referendum	  debate,	  but	  constitutional	  questions	  were	  undoubtedly	  central	  to	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  how	  the	  case	  for	  ‘Yes’	  needed	  to	  be	  understood.	  47	  Let	  Me	  Vote	  was	  an	  unsuccessful	  European	  Citizens’	  Initiative	  (www.letmevote.eu/en/).	  The	  issues	  are	  discussed	  in	  depth	  in	  P.	  Cayala,	  C.	  Seth	  and	  R.	  Bauböck	  (eds.),	  Should	  EU	  Citizens	  Living	  in	  
other	  Member	  States	  Vote	  there	  in	  National	  Elections?	  (2012)	  EUI	  Working	  Paper	  RSCAS	  2012/32,	  available	  at	  http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/22754/RSCAS_2012_32.pdf?sequence=1,	  accessed	  19	  July	  2016.	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and	  the	  UK.48	  Furthermore,	  with	  respect	  to	  participation	  in	  a	  longer-­‐term	  constitution	  building	  process,	  leading	  to	  a	  likely	  written	  constitution	  for	  Scotland	  (in	  contradistinction	  to	  the	  current	  position	  in	  the	  UK),49	  a	  number	  of	  options	  for	  incorporating	  the	  interests	  of	  non-­‐citizen	  residents	  might	  well	  have	  been	  on	  the	  table,	  e.g.	  via	  civil	  society	  participation.50	  	  
a)	  Legal	  and	  constitutional	  considerations:	  the	  Scottish	  referendum	  The	  franchise	  for	  the	  2014	  referendum	  was	  settled	  by	  legislation,	  based	  on	  the	  Edinburgh	  Agreement.	  This	  handed	  the	  determination	  of	  the	  franchise	  over	  to	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament,	  where	  normally	  it	  was	  a	  matter	  reserved	  to	  the	  Westminster	  Parliament.	  	  Under	  the	  Scottish	  Independence	  Referendum	  (Franchise)	  Act	  2013,	  the	  referendum	  franchise	  was	  based	  on	  the	  local	  government	  and	  Scottish	  Parliament	  electoral	  register,	  with	  the	  addition	  of	  16	  and	  17	  year-­‐olds.	  It	  was	  entirely	  residence-­‐based	  and	  rejected	  the	  voting	  claims	  of	  non-­‐resident	  ‘Scots’,	  whether	  they	  resided	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  UK	  or	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  world,	  however	  recently	  they	  departed	  and	  however	  they	  claimed	  to	  be	  ‘Scottish’	  (by	  descent,	  prior	  residence	  or	  birth).	  It	  therefore	  included	  resident	  EU,	  Irish	  and	  qualifying	  Commonwealth	  citizens	  (pursuant	  to	  a	  mix	  of	  UK	  law	  and	  EU	  law	  peculiar	  to	  the	  UK),	  but	  did	  not	  include	  any	  other	  non-­‐citizens,	  including	  those	  who	  have	  indefinite	  leave	  to	  remain	  in	  the	  UK.	  It	  also	  excluded	  prisoners,	  in	  like	  manner	  to	  electoral	  franchises	  at	  all	  levels	  right	  across	  the	  UK.51	  	  The	  exclusion	  of	  UK	  citizens	  with	  a	  connection	  to	  Scotland	  but	  no	  longer	  resident	  there	  encountered	  some	  public	  opposition,	  notably	  from	  London-­‐based	  Scots.	  Some	  suggested	  that	  this	  exclusion	  was	  contrary	  to	  EU	  law,52	  although	  the	  issue	  was	  not	  tested	  in	  the	  courts.	  The	  inclusion	  of	  EU	  citizens	  resident	  in	  Scotland	  along	  with	  the	  other	  categories	  of	  residents	  (i.e.	  Irish	  and	  qualifying	  Commonwealth	  citizens),	  who	  are	  generally	  enfranchised	  under	  UK	  law,	  received	  relatively	  little	  comment	  in	  the	  media.	  While	  some	  elements	  within	  the	  resident	  EU	  citizen	  community	  publicly	  embraced	  the	  opportunity	  to	  cast	  a	  ballot,53	  research	  suggests	  that	  for	  some,	  having	  the	  vote	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  burdensome	  privilege	  rather	  than	  an	  important	  opportunity	  for	  political	  self-­‐determination.54	  	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  the	  nationals	  of	  the	  other	  Member	  States	  were	  not	  part	  of	  the	  electorate	  for	  the	  1979	  devolution	  referendum,	  which	  was	  conducted	  on	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  J.	  Shaw,	  The	  Transformation	  of	  Citizenship	  in	  Europe	  (Cambridge:	  CUP,	  2007),	  pp.	  251–263.	  49	  See	  further	  McHarg	  above	  (n46).	  50	  A.	  Renwick,	  After	  the	  Referendum:	  Options	  for	  a	  Constitutional	  Convention	  (London:	  The	  Constitution	  Society,	  2014).	  51	  This	  was	  confirmed	  by	  the	  judgment	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  Moohan	  and	  Another	  v.	  Lord	  
Advocate	  [2014]	  UKSC	  67.	  A.	  Tickell,	  ‘Litigating	  with	  a	  Blunderbuss:	  Prisoner	  Votes,	  Moohan	  v	  Lord	  Advocate	  and	  the	  Independence	  Referendum	  Franchise’	  (2015)	  19	  Edinburgh	  Law	  Review	  409–414.	  52	  ‘Legal	  Challenge	  to	  Scottish	  Expats	  Being	  Denied	  Vote	  in	  Independence	  Referendum’	  (14	  March	  2014)	  Votes	  for	  Expats	  Blog,	  http://votes-­‐for-­‐expat-­‐brits-­‐blog.com/2014/03/14/legal-­‐challenge-­‐to-­‐scottish-­‐expats-­‐denial-­‐of-­‐vote-­‐in-­‐independence-­‐referendum/,	  accessed	  19	  July	  2016.	  53	  See	  for	  example,	  www.facebook.com/EuCitizensForAnIndependentScotland.	  	  54	  E.	  Piętka-­‐Nykaza	  and	  D.	  McGhee,	  ‘Stakeholder	  citizenship:	  the	  complexities	  of	  Polish	  migrants’	  citizenship	  attachments	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Scottish	  independence	  referendum’	  (2015)	  Citizenship	  
Studies,	  Online	  First	  View,	  DOI:	  10.1080/13621025.2015.1054789.	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basis	  of	  the	  Westminster	  (i.e.	  national)	  franchise.	  This	  preceded	  the	  establishment	  of	  EU	  voting	  rights.	  But	  using	  the	  Westminster	  franchise	  would	  still	  have	  included	  in	  the	  franchise	  Irish	  and	  qualifying	  Commonwealth	  citizens	  who	  have	  always	  voted	  in	  all	  UK	  elections	  –	  a	  principle	  which	  was	  recognised	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  in	  the	  Gibraltar	  case	  as	  being	  constitutional	  in	  character	  for	  the	  UK.55	  	  Furthermore,	  since	  the	  1979	  referendum,	  certain	  external	  voters	  have	  been	  included	  in	  the	  UK	  Westminster	  elections	  franchise,	  albeit	  with	  a	  maximum	  time	  limit	  at	  present	  of	  15	  years	  after	  departure	  from	  the	  UK.56	  The	  challenge	  of	  setting	  parameters	  for	  the	  inclusion	  of	  ‘external’	  voters	  for	  the	  referendum	  would	  have	  been	  very	  tough.	  If	  ‘external’	  voters	  had	  been	  included,	  presumably	  no	  distinction	  would	  have	  been	  drawn	  between	  those	  living	  in	  Paris	  and	  those	  living	  in	  London.	  Including	  external	  ‘Scots’	  would	  have	  required	  significant	  innovation	  in	  comparison	  to	  existing	  electoral	  registration	  practices,	  and	  would	  have	  imposed	  additional	  costs	  (including	  allowing	  persons	  resident	  in	  one	  part	  of	  the	  UK	  to	  vote	  in	  another	  part	  of	  the	  UK),	  without	  an	  obvious	  improvement	  in	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  process.	  	  Finally,	  in	  1997	  a	  precedent	  had	  been	  set	  in	  that	  the	  devolution	  referendum	  was	  run	  using	  the	  local	  elections	  franchise	  (i.e.	  including	  EU	  citizens	  and	  limiting	  the	  franchise	  by	  reference	  to	  residence),	  and	  this	  then	  became	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament	  elections	  franchise	  from	  1999	  onwards.	  In	  sum,	  the	  outcome	  may	  seem	  peculiar	  (and	  it	  is	  unique	  in	  the	  EU	  context),	  but	  its	  probable	  rationale	  in	  the	  UK	  system	  has	  been	  to	  emphasise	  the	  local	  as	  opposed	  to	  sovereign	  character	  of	  Scottish	  Parliament	  elections.57	  	  Now	  it	  was	  suggested,	  notably	  by	  Aidan	  O’Neill,58	  that	  the	  exclusion	  of	  non-­‐resident	  Scottish-­‐born	  UK	  citizens	  from	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  in	  the	  independence	  referendum	  was	  not	  compatible	  with	  EU	  law,	  because	  Member	  States	  –	  although	  they	  have	  the	  competence	  to	  determine	  a	  matter	  of	  national	  law	  such	  as	  the	  franchises	  in	  national	  elections	  or	  in	  an	  secession	  referendum	  –	  should	  act	  in	  compliance	  with	  EU	  law,	  including	  the	  principle	  of	  free	  movement,	  when	  exercising	  such	  a	  competence.	  The	  determination	  of	  the	  franchise	  is	  capable	  of	  affecting	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  individuals	  may	  exercise	  their	  free	  movement	  rights,	  because	  of	  the	  risk	  that	  the	  independence	  referendum	  would	  result	  in	  a	  vote	  for	  secession	  and	  that	  the	  new	  Scottish	  citizens	  (including	  those	  resident	  outside	  Scotland)	  may	  lose	  their	  EU	  citizenship	  and	  associated	  rights	  either	  for	  the	  shorter	  or	  the	  longer	  term.	  Member	  States	  must	  accordingly	  implement	  such	  a	  national	  competence	  in	  a	  manner	  not	  likely	  to	  impede	  free	  movement.	  Although	  this	  is	  a	  stretched	  definition	  of	  obstacles	  to	  free	  movement,	  O’Neill	  contended	  that	  the	  duties	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  extended	  that	  far	  nonetheless.	  He	  noted	  the	  interest	  that	  the	  European	  Commission	  has	  taken	  in	  the	  question	  of	  disenfranchisement	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Case	  C-­‐145/04	  Spain	  v.	  United	  Kingdom	  (Gibraltar),	  ECLI:EU:C:2006:231,	  discussed	  in	  Shaw,	  
Transformation	  of	  Citizenship	  (n48),	  pp.	  180–187.	  56	  See	  s.	  141	  Political	  Parties,	  Elections	  and	  Referendums	  Act	  2000.	  57	  See	  AXA	  General	  Insurance	  Company	  Ltd	  v	  Lord	  Advocate	  [2012]	  UKSC	  122,	  in	  which	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  gave	  its	  view	  on	  the	  non-­‐sovereign	  nature	  of	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament.	  58	  A.	  O’Neill,	  ‘(Dis)enfranchisement	  and	  free	  movement’,	  draft	  chapter,	  December	  2015,	  on	  file	  with	  the	  author.	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Member	  State	  nationals	  who	  are	  resident	  outside	  their	  state	  of	  citizenship,	  directing	  a	  Recommendation	  in	  particular	  at	  those	  Member	  States	  (including	  the	  UK)	  which	  limit	  the	  national	  voting	  rights	  of	  non-­‐resident	  citizens.59	  For	  UK	  citizens	  resident	  for	  more	  than	  15	  years	  outside	  the	  UK,	  the	  consequence	  of	  free	  movement	  is	  indeed	  disenfranchisement	  from	  participation	  in	  UK	  elections,	  and	  thus	  the	  possible	  loss	  of	  any	  right	  to	  vote	  in	  a	  national	  election	  unless	  they	  have	  taken	  up	  citizenship	  in	  the	  host	  state.	  But	  this	  may	  not	  be	  possible	  (or	  desirable)	  if,	  for	  example,	  the	  15-­‐plus	  years	  absence	  from	  the	  UK	  has	  been	  spent	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  host	  states,	  and/or	  if	  the	  host	  state	  does	  permit	  dual	  citizenship.	  The	  European	  Commission	  has	  recognised	  the	  difficulties	  that	  this	  raises,	  and	  highlighted	  that	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  Member	  States	  do	  make	  external	  voting	  rights	  available	  without	  time	  limitation,	  but	  the	  Commission’s	  measure	  is	  just	  that:	  a	  Recommendation	  without	  binding	  force.	  	  Overall,	  any	  attempt	  to	  invoke	  EU	  law	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  unsuccessful.	  Certainly,	  it	  is	  true	  to	  say	  that	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament,	  in	  adopting	  the	  Scottish	  Independence	  Referendum	  (Franchise)	  Act	  2013,	  did	  not	  have	  regard	  to	  the	  potential	  implications	  in	  relation	  to	  EU	  free	  movement,	  and	  it	  is	  also	  the	  case	  that	  such	  a	  vote	  does	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  affect	  the	  EU	  citizenship	  status	  of	  the	  putative	  citizens	  of	  a	  new	  state,	  because	  of	  the	  uncertainties	  of	  the	  (re-­‐)accession	  process.	  Moreover,	  since	  the	  referendum	  the	  connections	  between	  EU	  citizenship	  and	  national	  rules	  on	  the	  franchise	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  strengthened	  by	  the	  Delvigne	  case.60	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  held	  that	  French	  rules	  on	  the	  disenfranchisement	  of	  those	  who	  had	  committed	  a	  criminal	  offence	  (so	  far	  as	  they	  applied	  to	  European	  Parliament	  elections)	  fell	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  EU	  law	  and	  thus	  had	  to	  be	  justified	  as	  restrictions	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  universal	  suffrage	  enshrined	  inter	  alia	  in	  Article	  39(2)	  of	  the	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights	  as	  regards	  European	  Parliament	  elections	  (as	  well	  as	  in	  Article	  14(3)	  TEU	  and	  Article	  223	  TFEU).	  	  	  While	  this	  case	  opens	  up	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  new	  level	  of	  scrutiny	  on	  restrictions	  on	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  in	  European	  Parliament	  elections	  by	  reference	  to	  EU	  law,	  it	  creates	  a	  connection	  between	  EU	  law	  and	  national	  voting	  rights	  rules	  only	  in	  that	  respect,	  and	  without	  regard	  to	  the	  free	  movement	  issue.	  Successful	  challenges	  to	  restrictions	  contained	  in	  such	  rules	  might	  have	  a	  knock	  on	  effect	  (in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  in	  Scottish	  Parliament	  elections	  and	  in	  the	  Scottish	  independence	  referendum	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  knock	  on	  effects	  of	  the	  EU	  local	  electoral	  rights	  when	  understood	  in	  the	  particular	  constitutional	  context	  of	  the	  UK),	  but	  it	  does	  not	  in	  itself	  create	  a	  direct	  connection	  between	  EU	  law	  and	  EU	  citizenship	  and	  regional	  secession	  referendums.	  To	  that	  end,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  Delvigne	  case,	  reinforced	  by	  Judge	  Lenaerts,	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  European	  Commission,	  Commission	  Communication	  addressing	  the	  consequences	  of	  disenfranchisement	  of	  Union	  citizens	  exercising	  their	  right	  to	  free	  movement,	  COM(2014)	  33	  final;	  European	  Commission,	  Commission	  Recommendation	  addressing	  the	  consequences	  of	  disenfranchisement	  of	  Union	  citizens	  exercising	  their	  right	  to	  free	  movement,	  C(2014)	  391	  final.	  60	  Case	  C-­‐650/13	  Delvigne	  v.	  Commune	  de	  Lesparre	  Médoc	  and	  Préfet	  de	  la	  Gironde,	  ECLI:EU:C:2015:648.	  See	  J.	  Shaw,	  ‘Prisoner	  Voting:	  Now	  a	  Matter	  of	  EU	  law’	  (15	  October	  2015)	  EU	  
Law	  Analysis	  Blog,	  http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2015/10/prisoner-­‐voting-­‐now-­‐matter-­‐of-­‐eu-­‐law.html,	  accessed	  19	  July	  2016.	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newly	  (2015)	  elected	  President	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice,	  writing	  extra-­‐judicially.61	  He	  noted	  that	  it	  is	  significant	  that	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  ‘seminal’	  case	  of	  Delvigne	  proceeds	  by	  recognising	  the	  constitutional	  autonomy	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  representative	  democracy,	  long	  embedded	  in	  the	  provisions	  on	  European	  Parliament	  elections	  and	  given	  greater	  salience	  after	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  entered	  into	  force.	  Delvigne	  is	  not	  a	  judicial	  reading	  into	  the	  provisions	  on	  EU	  citizenship	  of	  an	  ‘incorporation	  doctrine’,	  possible	  in	  a	  federal	  state	  such	  as	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America,	  which	  opens	  the	  way	  for	  the	  highest	  court	  in	  the	  polity	  to	  scrutinise	  all	  legal	  provisions	  for	  their	  adherence	  to	  fundamental	  rights	  doctrines.	  Indeed,	  such	  a	  conclusion	  would	  require	  a	  more	  capacious	  construction	  of	  the	  constitutional	  significance	  of	  EU	  citizenship	  than	  has	  thus	  far	  been	  admitted	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice,	  despite	  the	  rhetoric	  that	  it	  is	  ‘destined	  to	  be	  the	  fundamental	  status	  of	  the	  nationals	  of	  the	  Member	  States’.62	  Any	  other	  conclusion,	  said	  Judge	  Lenaerts,	  would	  be	  contrary	  to	  the	  allocation	  of	  competences	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  the	  Member	  States	  enshrined	  in	  the	  treaties,	  and	  would	  also	  overstep	  the	  judicial	  function,	  by	  instituting	  a	  judge-­‐led	  reformation	  of	  the	  content	  of	  EU	  citizenship	  rights.	  	  
b)	  Legal	  and	  constitutional	  considerations:	  the	  EU	  referendum	  The	  franchise	  for	  the	  referendum	  on	  UK	  membership	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  was	  fixed	  at	  an	  early	  stage,	  as	  was	  the	  question.63	  The	  EU	  Referendum	  Act	  201564	  laid	  down	  that	  the	  franchise	  would	  be	  based	  on	  the	  general	  election	  franchise,	  with	  provision	  made	  also	  for	  members	  of	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  to	  vote,	  along	  with	  electors	  in	  Gibraltar	  who	  vote	  in	  European	  Parliament	  elections	  pursuant	  to	  the	  Matthews	  case.65	  One	  of	  the	  most	  contentious	  issues	  concerned	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  non-­‐resident	  UK	  citizens	  would	  be	  enfranchised.66	  The	  decision	  to	  continue	  with	  the	  15-­‐year	  external	  voting	  restriction	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  referendum	  franchise	  might	  be	  thought	  contestable,	  as	  the	  abolition	  of	  the	  rule	  was	  included	  in	  the	  2015	  general	  election	  manifesto	  of	  the	  Conservative	  Party	  and	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  a	  promised	  ‘Votes	  for	  Life’	  Bill,	  likely	  to	  come	  under	  discussion	  before	  the	  next	  anticipated	  general	  election	  (2020).67	  Questions	  were	  also	  raised	  regarding	  the	  exclusion	  of	  resident	  EU	  citizens,	  given	  that	  they	  had	  voted	  in	  the	  Scottish	  independence	  referendum.	  The	  third	  issue	  raised	  was	  that	  of	  enfranchising	  16	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  K.	  Lenaerts,	  ‘Linking	  EU	  Citizenship	  to	  Democracy’	  (2015)	  11	  Croatian	  Yearbook	  of	  European	  Law	  
and	  Policy,	  Editorial	  Note	  vii–xviii.	  62	  Case	  C-­‐184/99	  Grzelczyk,	  ECLI:EU:C:2001:458,	  para.	  31.	  See	  J.	  Shaw,	  ‘Citizenship:	  contrasting	  dynamics	  at	  the	  interface	  of	  integration	  and	  constitutionalism’,	  in	  P.	  Craig	  and	  G.	  de	  Búrca	  (eds.),	  
The	  Evolution	  of	  EU	  Law	  (2nd	  Edition,	  Oxford:	  OUP,	  2011),	  pp.	  575–609.	  63	  The	  referendum	  was	  held	  on	  the	  question:	  ‘Should	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  remain	  a	  member	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  or	  leave	  the	  European	  Union?’,	  under	  s1(4)	  EU	  Referendum	  Act	  2015.	  64	  www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/36/contents/enacted/data.htm.	  	  65	  Matthews	  v.	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  App	  No.	  24833/94,	  ECHR	  1999-­‐I.	  66	  For	  details	  of	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  amendment	  proposed	  on	  enfranchising	  non-­‐resident	  UK	  citizens	  regardless	  of	  time	  spent	  outside	  the	  UK	  see	  www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldhansrd/text/151118-­‐0002.htm#15111858000641,	  accessed	  19	  July	  2016.	  For	  analysis	  see	  C.	  Hanretty,	  ‘Does	  the	  #Brexit	  referendum	  franchise	  matter?’	  (15	  May	  2015)	  Blog,	  http://chrishanretty.co.uk/blog/index.php/2015/05/25/does-­‐the-­‐brexit-­‐referendum-­‐franchise-­‐matter/,	  accessed	  19	  July	  2016;	  and	  S.	  Peers,	  ‘Who	  should	  get	  the	  vote	  in	  a	  Brexit	  referendum?’	  (29	  January	  2015)	  EU	  Law	  Analysis	  Blog,	  http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2015/01/who-­‐should-­‐get-­‐vote-­‐in-­‐brexit-­‐referendum.html,	  accessed	  19	  July	  2016.	  	  67	  For	  details	  see	  I	  White,	  ‘Overseas	  Voters’	  (4	  July	  2016)	  House	  of	  Commons	  Library	  Briefing	  Paper	  No.	  5923.	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17	  year-­‐olds,	  who	  not	  only	  voted	  in	  the	  Scottish	  referendum	  but	  who	  have	  also,	  from	  2016,	  voted	  in	  Scottish	  Parliament	  elections.	  Of	  all	  the	  points	  of	  contention,	  it	  was	  the	  latter	  which	  attracted	  most	  support	  in	  the	  Westminster	  Parliament.	  The	  House	  of	  Lords	  inserted	  an	  amendment	  to	  give	  16	  and	  17	  year	  olds	  the	  right	  to	  vote,	  but	  this	  was	  reversed	  by	  the	  House	  of	  Commons.68	  	  In	  the	  end,	  all	  attempts	  to	  vary	  the	  Westminster	  franchise	  along	  these	  lines	  failed,	  despite	  the	  arguments	  that	  each	  group	  –	  resident	  EU	  citizens,	  UK	  ‘expats’	  and	  young	  voters	  –	  all	  have	  particularly	  high	  stakes	  in	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  referendum.	  There	  may	  be	  good	  political	  or	  justice-­‐based	  arguments	  for	  including	  those	  who	  are	  taking	  advantage	  of	  EU	  free	  movement	  rights	  (in	  whichever	  direction)	  in	  the	  decision	  on	  whether	  the	  UK	  remains	  a	  member	  of	  the	  EU	  or	  not,	  not	  least	  because	  EU	  citizens	  are	  selectively	  franchised	  in	  the	  UK	  at	  present.	  Irish	  citizens	  and	  Maltese	  and	  Cypriot	  citizens	  (as	  Commonwealth	  citizens)	  benefit	  from	  the	  existing	  rules.69	  Moreover,	  as	  all	  of	  these	  groups	  are	  outnumbered	  by	  ‘sedentary’	  citizens	  and	  voters,	  the	  case	  could	  perhaps	  be	  made	  for	  giving	  them	  a	  say.	  But	  one	  reason	  for	  not	  including	  either	  group	  of	  voters	  was	  the	  view	  –	  driven	  by	  opinion	  polling	  –	  that	  the	  overall	  outcome	  was	  likely	  to	  be	  close	  (as	  indeed	  it	  turned	  out	  to	  be),	  and	  the	  government,	  which	  largely	  drove	  the	  ‘scene-­‐setting’	  part	  of	  the	  process,	  did	  not	  want	  to	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  accusation	  of	  loading	  the	  dice	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  vote,	  however	  small	  or	  large	  the	  group	  included	  or	  excluded	  actually	  was.	  In	  that	  context,	  the	  Westminster	  franchise	  represented	  a	  safe	  haven.	  	  Returning	  to	  the	  arguments	  about	  EU	  law	  made	  previously,	  is	  there	  a	  more	  plausible	  connection	  to	  EU	  law	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  determination	  of	  the	  franchise	  for	  a	  referendum	  on	  state	  membership	  of	  the	  EU,	  as	  opposed	  to	  regional	  secession?	  In	  line	  with	  the	  free	  movement	  based	  argument	  made	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  inclusion	  of	  non-­‐resident	  Scottish	  born	  UK	  citizens	  in	  the	  Scottish	  referendum	  franchise,	  O’Neill	  has	  argued	  that	  a	  similar	  case	  could	  be	  made	  in	  respect	  of	  exclusion	  of	  EU	  citizens	  exercising	  their	  free	  movement	  rights	  (in	  either	  direction).	  The	  legislature	  should	  be	  under	  a	  duty,	  he	  argues,	  to	  set	  up	  a	  referendum	  franchise	  that	  has	  regard	  to	  their	  interests.70	  	  	  As	  Counsel	  representing	  two	  claimant	  non-­‐resident	  UK	  citizens	  Shindler	  and	  Maclennan	  in	  a	  2016	  case	  in	  the	  English	  courts	  challenging	  the	  UK’s	  EU	  referendum	  franchise,71	  O’Neill	  had	  an	  opportunity	  to	  have	  his	  argument	  reviewed	  by	  the	  judiciary	  at	  several	  levels.	  Before	  the	  Divisional	  Court,	  the	  April	  2016	  judgment	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  rule	  in	  Section	  2	  of	  the	  EU	  Referendum	  Act	  2015	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  For	  details	  of	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  bill	  see	  http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2015–16/europeanunionreferendum.html.	  69	  R.	  Ziegler,	  ‘The	  “Brexit”	  Referendum:	  We	  Need	  to	  Talk	  about	  the	  (General	  Election)	  Franchise’	  (7	  October	  2015)	  UK	  Constitutional	  Law	  Association	  Blog,	  https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2015/10/07/ruvi-­‐ziegler-­‐the-­‐brexit-­‐referendum-­‐we-­‐need-­‐to-­‐talk-­‐about-­‐the-­‐general-­‐election-­‐franchise/,	  accessed	  19	  July	  2016.	  	  70	  	  See	  O’Neill,	  ‘(Dis)enfranchisement’,	  above	  n.58.	  71	  	  Shindler	  and	  Maclennan	  v.	  Chancellor	  of	  the	  Duchy	  of	  Lancaster	  and	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Foreign	  
and	  Commonwealth	  Affairs	  [2016]	  EWHC	  957	  (Admin).	  For	  a	  brief	  comment,	  see	  H.	  Green,	  ‘Expats	  lose	  Supreme	  Court	  bid	  for	  right	  to	  vote	  in	  EU	  referendum’	  (2	  June	  2016),	  https://aberdeenunilaw.wordpress.com/tag/r-­‐shindler-­‐and-­‐anor-­‐v-­‐chancellor-­‐of-­‐the-­‐duchy-­‐of-­‐lancaster-­‐and-­‐another/	  accessed	  19	  July	  2016.	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settling	  the	  categories	  of	  persons	  entitled	  to	  vote	  in	  the	  referendum	  was	  quintessentially	  an	  exercise	  of	  national	  sovereignty	  or	  competence.	  Significantly	  the	  judges	  also	  accepted	  that	  such	  a	  national	  competence	  has	  to	  be	  exercised	  with	  due	  regard	  to	  EU	  law,	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  impact	  that	  the	  exercise	  of	  such	  a	  national	  competence	  would	  have	  on	  the	  exercise	  of	  rights	  under	  EU	  law,	  in	  particular	  the	  right	  of	  free	  movement.	  Notwithstanding	  that	  conclusion,	  the	  court	  followed	  the	  earlier	  ruling	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  in	  the	  Preston	  case	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  15	  year	  rule	  and	  UK	  parliamentary	  elections72	  that	  such	  an	  exclusionary	  rule	  could	  not	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  ‘restriction’	  on	  the	  rights	  of	  free	  movement	  of	  EU	  citizens	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  test	  currently	  applied	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice.	  Specifically,	  it	  is	  not	  a	  measure	  ‘liable	  to	  dissuade	  or	  deter	  EU	  citizens	  from	  exercising	  their	  rights	  of	  free	  movement’.73	  As	  in	  Preston	  the	  court	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  15	  year	  rule	  represents	  a	  ‘disadvantage’	  that	  results	  from	  choosing	  to	  reside	  outside	  the	  UK,	  but	  not	  every	  ‘disadvantage’	  can	  be	  characterized	  as	  a	  ‘restriction’.	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  formulate	  legal	  test	  that	  might	  adequately	  capture	  how	  the	  disadvantage	  of	  losing	  the	  vote	  after	  15	  years	  could	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  ‘restriction’	  that	  is	  liable	  to	  dissuade	  a	  person	  from	  exercising	  their	  free	  movement	  rights	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  To	  suggest	  otherwise,	  according	  to	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  in	  
Preston,	  would	  not	  ‘square	  with	  ordinary	  human	  experience’,	  or	  with	  the	  ‘inevitable	  uncertainties’	  of	  ‘crowded	  human	  lives’.	  There	  are	  simply	  too	  many	  unforeseeable	  circumstances	  between	  the	  decision	  to	  exercise	  free	  movement	  rights	  and	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  voting	  rights.74	  	  The	  case	  proceeded	  quickly	  to	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal,	  which	  handed	  down	  its	  judgment	  on	  20	  May	  2016.	  This	  time,	  the	  court	  took	  a	  firmer	  line	  on	  the	  hard	  kernel	  of	  sovereignty	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  national	  decisions	  on	  the	  franchise	  on	  a	  referendum	  such	  as	  the	  one	  to	  be	  held	  in	  June	  2016.	  Lord	  Dyson,	  the	  Master	  of	  the	  Rolls,	  concentrated	  his	  analysis	  on	  Article	  50	  TEU,	  and	  drew	  –	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  case	  law	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  upon	  the	  matter	  –	  upon	  what	  he	  regarded	  as	  an	  influential	  analysis	  of	  that	  provision	  by	  the	  German	  Federal	  Constitutional	  Court	  in	  its	  judgment	  on	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Lisbon.75	  He	  picked	  out	  one	  comment	  in	  particular:	  	   Whether	  these	  [national	  constitutional]	  requirements	  [referred	  to	  in	  Article	  50	  TEU]	  have	  been	  complied	  with	  in	  the	  individual	  case	  can,	  however,	  only	  be	  verified	  by	  the	  Member	  State	  itself,	  not	  by	  the	  European	  Union	  or	  the	  other	  Member	  States.76	  	  Accordingly,	  said	  Lord	  Dyson,	  	  	   It	  is	  clear	  from	  this	  analysis	  that	  the	  German	  Court	  did	  not	  accept	  that	  the	  domestic	  constitutional	  requirements	  applicable	  to	  a	  decision	  to	  withdraw	  were	  themselves	  subject	  to	  validation	  under	  EU	  law	  and	  could	  be	  overturned	  on	  grounds	  of	  incompatibility	  with	  the	  EU	  Treaties.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	  R	  (Preston)	  v.	  Wandsworth	  London	  Borough	  Council	  [2013]	  QB	  687.	  73	  Case	  C-­‐192/05	  Tas	  Hagen	  ECLI:EU:C:2006:676.	  74	  Preston	  above	  n.72	  at	  para.	  80.	  75	  Judgement	  No	  2	  BvE	  2/08,	  30	  June	  2009,	  http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html.	  	  76	  Paragraph	  330.	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  The	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  therefore	  distinguished	  the	  prior	  case	  of	  Preston,	  which	  concerned	  voting	  in	  UK	  parliamentary	  elections,	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  the	  settling	  of	  the	  franchise	  for	  a	  national	  decision	  about	  whether	  to	  withdraw	  is	  an	  exercise	  of	  national	  sovereignty	  –	  recognised	  under	  Article	  50	  TEU	  –	  about	  whether	  to	  be	  bound	  by	  EU	  law	  at	  all.	  It	  would,	  concluded	  Lord	  Dyson	  	   be	  contrary	  to	  [Article	  50]	  if	  articles	  of	  another	  EU	  Treaty	  [i.e.	  TFEU]	  relating	  to	  citizenship	  and	  free	  movement	  were	  to	  intervene	  so	  as	  to	  determine	  the	  constitutional	  requirements	  to	  be	  adopted	  by	  a	  Member	  State	  which	  is	  deciding	  whether	  to	  leave	  the	  EU.	  	  On	  that	  view,	  the	  claimants’	  case	  fell	  at	  the	  first	  hurdle	  –	  although	  in	  any	  event,	  the	  judges	  indicated	  that	  they	  also	  agreed	  with	  the	  lower	  court’s	  view	  of	  the	  issue	  of	  ‘restriction’	  of	  free	  movement.	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  approved	  the	  conclusions	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  without	  holding	  a	  full	  hearing	  on	  the	  matter.	  What	  was	  most	  instructive	  about	  this	  case	  was	  that	  we	  saw	  the	  terrain	  of	  the	  argument	  moving	  away	  from	  the	  issue	  of	  free	  movement.	  By	  placing	  the	  emphasis	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  sovereignty	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  decisively	  moved	  the	  issue	  onto	  quite	  different	  terrain,	  where	  it	  aligned	  itself	  with	  the	  traditionally	  sovereignty-­‐sensitive	  German	  constitutional	  court	  on	  matters	  such	  as	  Kompetenz-­‐Kompetenz.	  In	  view	  of	  the	  vote	  to	  leave	  the	  EU	  on	  23	  June	  2016,	  and	  the	  extensive	  discussion	  of	  Article	  50	  TEU	  thereafter,	  this	  is	  an	  interesting	  move	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  court.	  	  
c)	  Normative	  considerations:	  a	  brief	  note	  It	  is	  widely	  accepted	  that	  the	  franchise,	  at	  least	  for	  the	  Scottish	  referendum,	  was	  established	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  process	  of	  legitimate	  constitutional	  decision-­‐making	  within	  the	  existing	  United	  Kingdom.	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  any	  other	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  of	  who	  should	  vote	  in	  that	  referendum	  would	  have	  been	  so	  indeterminate	  as	  to	  be	  illegitimate.	  77	  However,	  ‘right-­‐sizing’	  participation	  in	  votes	  such	  as	  independence	  referendums	  or	  referendums	  on	  membership	  of	  supranational	  associations	  such	  as	  the	  EU	  raises	  normative	  considerations	  as	  well	  as	  legal	  and	  practical	  complexities.78	  	  Ruvi	  Ziegler	  has	  argued79	  that	  it	  is	  normatively	  desirable	  that	  there	  should	  be	  as	  much	  congruence	  as	  possible	  between	  those	  who	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  the	  citizens	  of	  a	  new	  state	  and	  those	  who	  vote	  in	  any	  independence	  referendum,	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  this	  group	  represent	  the	  primary	  ‘stakeholders’	  (adopting	  Rainer	  Bauböck’s	  terminology	  for	  the	  normative	  basis	  on	  which	  citizenship	  should	  be	  granted)80	  in	  the	  referendum.	  His	  argument	  depends	  on	  accepting	  the	  principle	  that	  there	  should	  be	  a	  link	  between	  citizenship	  status	  and	  voting,	  which	  is	  widely,	  but	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  	  B.	  Ryan,	  ‘The	  Scottish	  Referendum	  Franchise:	  Residence	  or	  Citizenship?’,	  in	  Ziegler	  et	  al.,	  ‘Independence	  Referendums’	  (n45).	  78	  This	  is	  discussed	  at	  length	  in	  Ziegler	  et	  al.,	  ‘Independence	  Referendums’	  (n45).	  Space	  precludes	  further	  discussion	  in	  this	  chapter.	  79	  R.	  Ziegler,	  ‘Kick	  Off	  Contribution’,	  in	  Ziegler	  et	  al.,	  ‘Independence	  Referendums’	  (n45).	  80	  See	  R.	  Bauböck,	  ‘Stakeholder	  Citizenship	  and	  Transnational	  Political	  Participation:	  a	  normative	  evaluation	  of	  external	  voting’	  (2007)	  75	  Fordham	  Law	  Review,	  2393–2447.	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universally,	  accepted	  by	  commentators.81	  Indeed,	  with	  respect	  to	  many	  elections	  worldwide	  (especially	  but	  not	  only	  local	  elections),	  the	  vote	  is	  in	  practice	  accorded	  to	  many	  residents	  who	  do	  not	  (yet)	  have	  citizenship,	  and	  the	  UK	  has	  never	  had	  congruence	  between	  the	  two,	  more	  for	  reasons	  of	  historical	  accident	  than	  political	  principle.	  	  Ziegler	  has	  argued	  that	  under-­‐inclusiveness	  (i.e.	  the	  exclusion	  of	  putative	  citizens)	  ‘would	  undermine	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  referendum,	  not	  least	  for	  disenfranchised	  persons	  affected	  by	  a	  new	  legal	  reality’.	  Over-­‐inclusiveness	  –	  i.e.	  the	  inclusion	  of	  groups	  who	  would	  not	  be	  expected	  to	  receive	  citizenship	  –	  mandates	  that	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  putative	  citizenry	  should	  be	  rethought.	  Perhaps	  those	  groups	  should	  be	  offered	  citizenship.	  In	  Ziegler’s	  view	  the	  Scottish	  independence	  referendum	  franchise	  did	  not	  satisfy	  the	  test	  of	  congruence,	  although	  he	  acknowledged	  that	  it	  would	  be	  a	  hard	  test	  to	  satisfy	  in	  practice,	  not	  least	  because	  of	  the	  challenge	  of	  identifying	  the	  putative	  external	  citizens.	  It	  would	  have	  been	  difficult,	  if	  not	  impossible,	  to	  establish	  an	  electoral	  register	  that	  additionally	  distinguished	  between	  former	  Scottish	  residents	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  had	  been	  born	  in	  Scotland	  (i.e.	  the	  putative	  citizenship	  criterion	  according	  to	  the	  White	  Paper).	  In	  like	  manner,	  Ziegler	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  EU	  referendum	  franchise	  demands	  that	  the	  UK	  should	  take	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  its	  general	  election	  franchise.82	  However,	  there	  is	  another	  way	  of	  looking	  at	  over-­‐inclusiveness,	  as	  Ben	  Saunders	  has	  argued:	  it	  is	  generally	  better	  to	  err	  on	  the	  side	  of	  over	  rather	  than	  under-­‐inclusiveness,	  not	  least	  because	  –	  as	  he	  suggested	  –	  not	  all	  those	  who	  are	  offered	  the	  vote	  need	  exercise	  it.83	  	  Rainer	  Bauböck,	  in	  contrast,	  defended	  the	  approach	  of	  setting	  a	  residence-­‐based	  franchise,	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  giving	  normative	  force	  to	  the	  ‘regional	  citizenship’	  that	  currently	  delimits	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  franchise	  for	  the	  Scottish	  Parliament	  elections	  correctly	  reflects	  the	  character	  of	  the	  referendum	  in	  such	  a	  case.	  As	  a	  case	  of	  consensual	  self-­‐determination	  in	  which	  the	  national	  and	  the	  regional	  legislatures	  had	  agreed	  upon	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  vote,	  the	  decision	  concerns	  whether	  to	  upgrade	  the	  regional	  citizenship	  which	  currently	  exists	  into	  that	  of	  an	  independent	  state.	  This	  is	  the	  only	  ‘real’	  demos	  which	  exists.	  The	  citizens	  of	  an	  independent	  state	  are	  only	  a	  putative	  demos,	  and	  according	  to	  Bauböck:	  	   The	  putative	  demos	  of	  an	  independent	  Scotland	  should	  not	  replace	  the	  existing	  demos	  of	  Scotland	  as	  part	  of	  the	  UK	  in	  a	  decision	  about	  independence	  because	  only	  the	  latter	  but	  not	  the	  former	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  democratically	  legitimate.84	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  For	  critiques	  see	  H.	  Lardy,	  ‘Citizenship	  and	  the	  Right	  to	  Vote’	  (1997)	  17	  Oxford	  Journal	  of	  Legal	  
Studies,	  75–100;	  and	  D.	  Owen,	  ‘Transnational	  citizenship	  and	  the	  democratic	  state:	  modes	  of	  membership	  and	  voting	  rights’	  (2011)	  14	  Critical	  Review	  of	  International	  Social	  and	  Political	  
Philosophy,	  641–663.	  82	  See	  Ziegler,	  ‘Brexit’	  (n69).	  83	  	  B.	  Saunders,	  ‘Not	  all	  who	  are	  enfranchised	  need	  participate’,	  in	  Ziegler	  et	  al.,	  ‘Independence	  Referendums’	  (n45).	  For	  an	  extended	  articulation	  of	  Saunders’	  position,	  see	  B.	  Saunders,	  ‘Scottish	  Independence	  and	  the	  All-­‐Affected	  Interests	  Principle’	  (2013)	  33	  Politics,	  47–55.	  84	  Bauböck,	  ‘Regional	  Citizenship’	  (n45).	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This	  conclusion	  accords	  with	  the	  actual	  practice	  adopted	  in	  Scotland	  in	  2014,	  even	  if	  that	  practice	  itself	  could	  be	  said	  to	  be	  based	  on	  a	  rather	  muddled	  notion	  of	  the	  regional	  demos	  stemming	  from	  the	  highly	  contingent	  approach	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  UK	  over	  the	  years	  to	  the	  intertwining	  of	  citizenship	  and	  voting.	  	  
5.	  Conclusions:	  on	  the	  intertwining	  of	  citizenship	  and	  voting	  The	  task	  undertaken	  in	  this	  chapter	  has	  been	  to	  bring	  together	  two	  dimensions	  of	  troubled	  membership,	  each	  complex	  in	  itself:	  the	  challenge	  of	  establishing	  or	  re-­‐establishing	  a	  citizenship	  regime,	  in	  particular	  after	  a	  secession	  referendum,	  and	  the	  definition	  of	  political	  citizenship	  in	  the	  context	  of	  consensual	  acts	  of	  self-­‐determination	  leading	  to	  secession/withdrawal.	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  constitutional	  particularities	  of	  the	  UK	  (and	  the	  likely	  challenges	  facing	  an	  iScotland),	  as	  well	  as	  normative	  considerations	  attendant	  upon	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  
demos,	  hang	  not	  too	  far	  in	  the	  background.	  Moreover,	  these	  contestations	  are	  ongoing	  and	  do	  not	  attach	  simply	  to	  separate	  and	  definable	  ‘moments’	  of	  constitutional	  change.	  Each	  of	  the	  overlapping	  polities	  we	  are	  studying	  is	  constantly	  mutating	  and	  adapting	  to	  the	  new	  conditions.	  	  The	  point	  is	  well	  illustrated	  if	  we	  reflect	  on	  the	  intersection	  between	  the	  continuing	  Scottish	  independence	  movement	  (bolstered	  by	  a	  relatively	  narrow	  defeat	  in	  2014)	  and	  the	  Eurosceptic	  movement	  which	  pushed	  successive	  UK	  governments	  gradually	  closer	  to	  holding	  an	  in/out	  referendum	  on	  UK	  membership	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  triumphed	  in	  the	  2016	  EU	  referendum.	  For	  some,	  this	  amounts	  to	  juxtaposing	  Scottish	  nationalism	  and	  English	  nationalism,	  given	  the	  territorial	  disparities	  of	  the	  referendum	  results,	  although	  this	  downplays	  the	  complexities	  of	  navigating	  membership	  and	  attachment	  in	  a	  multilevel	  constitutional	  framework.	  The	  interactions	  between	  these	  two	  self-­‐determination	  claims	  are	  complex	  and	  the	  outcomes	  which	  will	  flow	  from	  the	  result	  of	  the	  EU	  referendum	  are	  still	  hard	  to	  predict.	  Although	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  UK	  political	  elite	  remains	  avowedly	  Unionist,	  the	  distinct	  character	  of	  the	  result	  was	  one	  of	  the	  voting	  scenarios	  which	  was	  self-­‐evidently	  likely	  to	  	  place	  intense	  pressures	  upon	  the	  viability	  of	  the	  British	  union	  state.	  In	  that	  sense	  	  the	  holding	  of	  an	  EU	  referendum	  to	  placate	  Eurosceptic	  forces	  is	  now	  widely	  accepted	  as	  having	  been	  a	  foolish	  political	  risk	  to	  take	  for	  those	  who	  support	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  British	  state	  within	  its	  current	  boundaries.	  	  Since	  the	  UK	  as	  a	  whole	  –	  led	  by	  the	  numerically	  superior	  English	  voting	  population	  –	  voted	  to	  leave,	  but	  Scotland,	  Northern	  Ireland	  and	  Gibraltar	  voted	  to	  remain,	  a	  series	  of	  major	  challenges	  now	  face	  the	  UK.	  This	  scenario	  did	  receive	  some	  attention	  in	  the	  press	  and	  amongst	  commentators	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  referendum,	  but	  the	  risks	  that	  it	  posed	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  have	  swayed	  the	  wider	  voting	  public.85	  Predictably,	  the	  Scottish	  First	  Minister	  Nicola	  Sturgeon	  (a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	  See	  e.g.	  J.	  Nickerson,	  ‘EU	  referendum:	  Could	  a	  Brexit	  vote	  lead	  to	  a	  second	  Scottish	  independence	  referendum?’	  (6	  January	  2016)	  City	  AM,	  www.cityam.com/231838/could-­‐a-­‐brexit-­‐vote-­‐lead-­‐to-­‐a-­‐second-­‐scottish-­‐independence-­‐referendum,	  accessed	  19	  July	  2016;	  F.	  Perraudin,	  ‘Sturgeon:	  new	  Scottish	  referendum	  “probably	  unstoppable”	  if	  UK	  votes	  to	  leave	  EU’	  (16	  October	  2015)	  The	  
Guardian,	  www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/oct/16/nicola-­‐sturgeon-­‐new-­‐scottish-­‐referendum-­‐probably-­‐unstoppable-­‐if-­‐uk-­‐votes-­‐to-­‐leave-­‐eu,	  accessed	  19	  July	  2016;	  K.	  Hughes,	  ‘Rough	  waters	  ahead	  for	  Scotland	  if	  the	  UK	  votes	  “no”	  in	  EU	  referendum’	  (16	  August	  2015)	  Open	  
Democracy,	  www.opendemocracy.net/can-­‐europe-­‐make-­‐it/kirsty-­‐hughes/rough-­‐waters-­‐ahead-­‐for-­‐
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supporter	  of	  independence)	  has	  worked	  hard	  to	  highlight	  the	  Scottish	  ‘difference’,	  appointing	  a	  Standing	  Council	  on	  Europe	  to	  advise	  her	  on	  how	  the	  benefits	  of	  Scotland’s	  EU	  membership	  can	  best	  be	  preserved.86	  While	  Sturgeon	  has	  not	  ruled	  out	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  second	  referendum	  on	  Scottish	  independence,	  it	  is	  significant	  that	  the	  new	  UK	  Prime	  Minister	  Theresa	  May	  (herself	  described	  as	  a	  ‘reluctant	  Remainer’)	  made	  her	  first	  visit	  after	  appointment	  to	  Edinburgh	  to	  see	  FM	  Sturgeon	  and	  stated	  that	  she	  would	  not	  trigger	  the	  formal	  withdrawal	  talks	  under	  Article	  50	  TEU	  until	  she	  had	  secured	  ‘a	  UK	  wide	  approach	  and	  objectives’.87	  This	  seems	  to	  suggest	  a	  prolonged	  period	  of	  uncertainty	  and	  negotiations.	  	  It	  is	  also	  worth	  highlighting	  one	  other	  troublesome	  scenario	  which	  did	  not	  transpire,	  	  	  described	  by	  James	  Mitchell	  as	  ‘the	  West	  Lothian	  Question	  writ	  large’.88	  What	  would	  have	  happened	  if	  England	  and	  Wales	  had	  voted	  narrowly	  in	  favour	  of	  leaving,	  but	  Scotland	  had	  voted	  overwhelmingly	  in	  favour	  of	  remaining,	  in	  sufficient	  numbers	  to	  tip	  the	  overall	  balance	  of	  the	  result?89	  This	  would	  have	  been	  	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  Scotland	  was	  seen	  to	  have	  affected	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  whole	  United	  Kingdom	  in	  relation	  to	  EU	  membership	  against	  the	  ‘will’	  of	  England	  and	  Wales.	  Might	  this	  have	  led	  to	  the	  UK	  ‘expelling’	  Scotland,	  rather	  than	  Scotland	  choosing	  to	  secede?	  	  And	  finally,	  beyond	  the	  possibilities	  offered	  by	  territorial	  politics	  and	  the	  reconfiguration	  of	  state	  boundaries,	  what	  types	  of	  individual	  solutions	  might	  citizens	  find	  in	  order	  to	  improve	  their	  options	  and	  life	  chances,	  both	  in	  relation	  to	  political	  voice	  and	  also	  to	  migration/return	  migration	  potential?	  For	  example,	  anyone	  born	  in	  Northern	  Ireland	  is	  able	  to	  opt	  for	  Irish	  citizenship	  in	  addition	  to	  UK	  citizenship	  (as	  are	  those	  with	  Irish	  parents	  or	  grandparents),	  and	  it	  seems	  they	  are	  choosing	  to	  do	  so	  in	  increasing	  numbers	  to	  offset	  the	  risk	  of	  the	  UK	  leaving	  the	  EU.90	  Up	  to	  six	  million	  people	  in	  the	  UK	  are	  said	  to	  be	  eligible	  to	  seek	  Irish	  passports	  based	  on	  having	  an	  Irish	  parent	  or	  grandparent.	  EU	  citizens	  in	  the	  UK	  may	  seek	  to	  combine	  UK	  citizenship,	  along	  with	  their	  existing	  citizenship,	  and	  likewise	  UK	  citizens	  resident	  in	  other	  Member	  States	  may	  also	  seek	  citizenship	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  scotland-­‐if-­‐uk-­‐votes-­‐'no'-­‐in-­‐eu-­‐referendum,	  accessed	  19	  July	  2016;	  Curtice,	  ‘Might	  Scotland	  Vote’	  (nError!	  Bookmark	  not	  defined.).	  86	  Scottish	  Government,	  ‘First	  Minister	  forms	  group	  to	  advise	  on	  Scotland’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  EU’,	  (28	  June	  2016)	  http://news.scotland.gov.uk/News/Standing-­‐Council-­‐on-­‐Europe-­‐25c6.aspx,	  accessed	  19	  July	  2016.	  87	  ‘May	  says	  won't	  trigger	  EU	  divorce	  until	  UK-­‐wide	  approach	  agreed’(15	  July	  2016)	  Reuters,	  http://www.reuters.com/article/us-­‐britain-­‐eu-­‐scotland-­‐may-­‐idUSKCN0ZV1I0,	  accessed	  19	  July	  2016.	  88	  See	  Mitchell,	  ‘Unpredictable’	  (n20).	  The	  West	  Lothian	  Question	  is	  usually	  described	  in	  terms	  of	  Scottish	  MPs	  voting	  on	  matters	  that	  only	  affect	  England	  (or	  at	  least	  not	  Scotland),	  and	  was	  recently	  addressed	  through	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  limited	  version	  of	  English	  Votes	  for	  English	  Laws’	  (EVEL)	  by	  means	  of	  Standing	  Order	  changes	  in	  the	  Westminster	  Parliament.	  89	  S.	  Carrell,	  ‘EU	  referendum:	  English	  votes	  to	  leave	  could	  be	  offset	  by	  rest	  of	  UK’	  (2	  December	  2015)	  The	  Guardian,	  www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/dec/02/eu-­‐referendum-­‐english-­‐votes-­‐offset-­‐by-­‐scotland-­‐wales-­‐northern-­‐ireland-­‐uk,	  accessed	  19	  July	  2016.	  90	  This	  option	  was	  cited	  in	  the	  Scottish	  context	  by	  Jim	  Gallagher:	  see	  J.	  Gallagher,	  ‘	  Citizenship,	  Borders	  and	  Migration	  in	  an	  Independent	  Scotland’	  (September	  2013)	  Policy	  Primer,	  www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/policy-­‐primers/citizenship-­‐borders-­‐and-­‐migration-­‐independent-­‐scotland,	  accessed	  19	  July	  2016.	  ‘Britons	  swamp	  Ireland	  with	  passport	  applications’	  (27	  June	  2016)	  Financial	  Times,	  https://next.ft.com/content/b258cb28-­‐3c82-­‐11e6-­‐9f2c-­‐36b487ebd80a	  accessed	  19	  July	  2016.	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more	  actively	  than	  at	  present.91	  If,	  as	  seems	  anecdotally	  to	  be	  happening,92	  larger	  numbers	  of	  citizens	  choose	  these	  options	  it	  could	  lead	  to	  a	  substantial	  reconfiguration	  of	  the	  ‘we’	  who	  inhabit	  these	  islands.	  These	  considerations	  are	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  complex	  citizenship	  changes	  we	  would	  expect	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  Scottish	  secession	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  UK.	  	  At	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  the	  matters	  under	  discussion	  were	  fluid	  in	  character.	  But	  the	  complexities	  of	  the	  UK’s	  case	  of	  troubled	  membership	  are	  already	  visible,	  if	  not	  always	  easy	  to	  comprehend,	  because	  so	  many	  different	  aspects	  of	  the	  UK’s	  constitutional	  constellation	  are	  brought	  into	  question.	  
	  This	  chapter	  does	  not	  seek	  to	  assert	  that	  the	  Scottish	  case	  provides	  some	  sort	  of	  paradigm	  that	  others	  might	  follow.	  Each	  case	  of	  regional	  ‘trouble’	  in	  the	  EU	  (e.g.	  Catalonia,	  Flanders,	  etc.)	  is	  different,	  characterised	  by	  different	  constellations	  of	  political	  forces	  and	  constitutional	  contexts,	  and	  the	  UK	  is	  unique	  in	  (currently)	  compounding	  its	  regional	  ‘trouble’	  with	  an	  additional	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  state	  as	  a	  whole	  should	  remain	  a	  Member	  State	  of	  the	  European	  Union.	  What	  this	  chapter	  has	  sought	  to	  do	  is	  to	  show	  that	  citizenship	  –	  as	  a	  legal	  status	  and	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  political	  membership	  –	  operates	  as	  a	  useful	  prism	  through	  which	  to	  observe	  the	  interplay	  of	  individual	  status	  and	  rights,	  of	  competing	  and	  overlapping	  legal	  orders,	  and	  of	  political	  contestations	  of	  belonging	  and	  membership.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  	  On	  EU	  citizens	  naturalizing	  in	  the	  UK,	  see	  Migration	  Observatory,	  ‘Naturalisation	  as	  a	  British	  Citizen.	  Concepts	  and	  Trends’	  (March	  2015)	  www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/briefings/naturalisation-­‐british-­‐citizen-­‐concepts-­‐and-­‐trends,	  accessed	  19	  July	  2016.	  Discerning	  the	  naturalisation	  rates	  for	  UK	  citizens	  in	  other	  EU	  Member	  States	  is	  a	  much	  more	  difficult	  task.	  92	  ‘Thousands	  of	  Brits	  rush	  for	  EU	  passports	  after	  Brexit	  vote’	  (18	  July	  2016)	  CNN	  Money,	  http://money.cnn.com/2016/07/18/news/uk-­‐british-­‐european-­‐passports-­‐citizenship-­‐brexit/	  accessed	  19	  July	  2016.	  
